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Introduction1
1 Bartholomew the Englishman (before 1202–1272), Thomas of Cantimpré (1201–1270/2),
and  Vincent  of  Beauvais  (c.  1184/94–c.  1264)  each  aimed  to  gather  the  existing
knowledge of their time and make it available in the form of a single book. This was not
an  easy  task,  as  they  were  confronted  with  an extensive  body  of  thought  from
numerous  traditions.  While  Platonic  and  Aristotelian  ideas  underlie  these  diverse
traditions, the encyclopaedists were confronted with their interpretations, collations,
and their further development.
2 Perception is not a theme on its own in the encyclopaedias. It is discussed to some
extent in connection with the sense organs of humans and animals, and in more detail
in connection with the different objects of sensation such as colour and flavour. Its
proper place in these encyclopaedias is in the explanation of the soul and its activities.2
To  understand  perception,  we  have  to,  then,  first  comprehend  the  different
conceptions of the soul.
3 To my knowledge, the most comprehensive discussion of the soul and its operation in
these encyclopaedias was provided in 1928 by Ludwig Lieser, who analysed the books
dedicated to the soul in Vincent’s Speculum naturale (LIESER, 1928). Monique Paulmier-
Foucart, for her part, relates specifically the transformation of the arrangement of the
five outer senses in two different composition stages of the Speculum with two views of
the soul: a medical and a philosophical (PAULMIER-FOUCART, 2000: 278–280). In her study
of imagination and fantasy in various encyclopaedias, Christel Meier-Staubach similarly
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distinguishes between a physiological-medical and a functional-philosophical view of
the potencies of the soul. The physiological-medical tradition, with its doctrine of the
three  cells,  is  found,  for  instance,  in  the  encyclopaedias  of  Bartholomew  the
Englishman and of Thomas of Cantimpré (MEIER, 2003: 163–164; 167). The functional-
philosophical account of the soul faculties (or more precisely, of the inner senses) is
exemplified by Vincent’s treatment in his Speculum (MEIER, 2003: 168–173; see also VINGE,
1975:  70). In  another  contribution,  Christel  Meier-Staubach  analyses  both  of  these
traditions in their relation to order principles of the encyclopaedias, especially in the
Speculum (MEIER, 2002: 179–184). Recently, Iolanda Ventura has compared the arguments
attributed to the « philosophers » (Aristotle) and to the « physicians » (VENTURA, 2012:
105;  131–133).  Vincent,  Thomas  and  Bartholomew  seem  to  recognise  two  different
accounts  of  the  soul  and  its  powers—as  she  indicates  when  analysing  the  use  of
Aristotle  primarily  in  the  passages  dedicated  to  the  lungs  and  to  the  heart  in  De
proprietatibus (VENTURA, 2012: 62–63; 104–105). On discussing the relationship between
soul and body, Bernard Ribémont classifies in contrast the sources of Bartholomew and
Thomas as  « theological »  and « medical »  (RIBÉMONT, 1995:  159–160).  In his  analysis,
Ribémont examines above all the book on the soul in De proprietatibus (RIBÉMONT, 1995:
158–176),  which proves to be rather complex: In accordance with the text itself,  he
considers the soul in its relation to the body, in relation to its ends, and in relation to
its  works  (RIBÉMONT, 1995:  166).  Later,  he  proposes  a  somewhat  altered  schema  of
Bartholomew’s discussion about the powers of the soul,  basing it  on the division in
vegetative  (« growing »),  sensitive  and  rational  (RIBÉMONT, 1995:  167).  In  the
introduction to  his  edition of  the book on the soul,  Raymond J.  Long distinguishes
between four different accounts of the soul potencies (according to its end, to its act, to
its body, and to how the soul acts in the body) (LONG, 2007)3. Michael C. Seymour has
delivered  an  outline  of  the  same book  (drawing  on  the  English  version  of  John of
Trevisa), which follows roughly the plan of Aristotle’s De anima, and a thorough survey
of its sources (SEYMOUR, 1992: 49–53).
4 In  this  paper,  I  too  will  be  concerned  with  the  powers  attributed  to  the  soul,  the
divisions of the soul,  and the process of perception. As mentioned above, there are
several studies on the soul and its powers in the encyclopaedias,  but none of them
considers  thoroughly  and  systematically  the  (many)  powers  of  the  soul  and  the
different accounts of  them in the three encyclopaedias4.  There are good reasons to
adopt  the  distinction  between  philosophers  and  physicians—the  strongest  of  them
being that the encyclopaedists employ it, too. In order to attain a comprehensive plan
and to illustrate the interweaving between the different traditions, I  will be though
concerned  with  four  different  « distinctions »  of  the  soul  and  with  two  different
accounts of the function of the inner soul potencies in their relationship to knowledge.
These divisions and accounts will be shown in the three encyclopaedias, so as to expose
clearly their similarities and differences. In addition, to provide an overview of these
accounts  and  their  philosophical  underpinnings,  each  section  is  introduced  with  a
discussion of  the  encyclopaedists’  sources  already identified  by  other  researchers—
significantly,  the  ones  mentioned  for  the  Speculum  naturale by  the  SourcEncyMe
project5.  The  placement  of  the  « inner  senses »  in  books  25  (and  also  27)  and  the
description  of  their  operation  will  be  considered  at  greater  length,  giving  a  more
detailed insight into the treatment of the various sources. Furthermore, I will consider
the task of the intellect(s) in the process of abstraction—an important contribution of
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the Peripatetic philosophy dealt with by Lieser. The discussion follows closely and, in
the case of the Speculum naturale, rather extensively the arguments presented in the
encyclopaedias. The resulting arrangement is inevitably more schematic than the one
displayed in the encyclopaedias. Nonetheless, it presents an initial exploration on the
selection and arrangement of sources. Other significant subjects in the encyclopaedias,
such as the ontological status of the soul, the (im)materiality of the soul, and the role of
the « rational soul » in knowledge of good and of God, will be merely touched upon.
 
Kinds and Divisions of the Soul
5 Bartholomew and Thomas each dedicate a book to the soul in their compendia (see
Appendices 1 and 2). In the revised, full-fledged Speculum naturale, one of the original
three books of his Speculum maius, Vincent of Beauvais expounds the different views of
the  soul  in  five  books  (see  Appendix  3).  Concurring  with  most  traditions,  these
encyclopaedists conceived of the soul as a singular substance, which possesses different
powers or virtues (the terms potentia and virtus are generally used synonymously). The
traditional accounts distinguish between different powers operating within the soul,
which  also  have  manifold  functions6.  Since  the  encyclopaedists  are  aware  of  these
dissimilarities, they  try  to  order  these  various  models  of  the  soul  with  respect  to
different  points  of  view (Bartholomew and Vincent).  The use of  the same terms to
define diverse potencies, the similar function that they assume in the various schemes,
and  also  the  grouping  of  the  same  potencies  along  different  schemes,  cause  some
confusion about the models of the soul.
 
The Platonic distinction: the concupiscible, irascible, and rational
souls
6 The notion of three parts of the soul, also referred to as the concupiscible, irascible,
and rational souls, is of Platonic origin7.  It passed into the Middle Ages through the
writings of Augustine (354–430), Nemesius of Emesa (fl. c. 390), and John of Damascus
(c. 650–754), among others; and it was complemented through the reception of Arabic
texts by the end of the 12th century (BRUNGS, 2009: 31–32). The main direct source for
Bartholomew,  Thomas  and  Vincent  for  expounding  the  Platonic  distinction  was  De
spiritu et anima8. This treatise, sometimes quoted as De anima et spiritu, was written by a
Cistercian monk, and commonly attributed to Augustine9; Vincent thought its author to
be Hugh of St. Victor. The use of the same source explains why some of the content and
wording  are  quite  similar  in  the  three  encyclopaedias.  This  writing  is  also  a
fundamental source for the influential Summa de anima of John of La Rochelle (written
about 1235/6)10, to which Vincent refers extensively.
7 If the powers of the soul are considered according to its ends, then—as Bartholomew
states—the soul can be divided into rational, concupiscible, and irascible powers. The
rational  power aims at  truth since it  is  the faculty concerned with knowledge.  The
concupiscible power aims at the good, since it has the will and the desire of what is
good. The irascible drives at what is stable and eternal; it is responsible for the flight
from the  opposite,  from evil.  These  powers  could  also  be  regarded as  cognitive  or
apprehensive (of the truth), as affective (towards the good), and as motive (away from
evil).  The senses originate in the rational or apprehensive power, and affection and
Ordering the Soul. Senses and Psychology in 13th Century Encyclopaedias
RursuSpicae, 3 | 2020
3
motion in the concupiscible and irascible soul respectively. There are four affections:
joy, hope, fear and pain. Joy and hope are produced by the concupiscible soul, fear and
pain by the irascible (BARTHOLOMAEUS ANGLICUS, DPR, 3.6.32-52)11.
8 Thomas of Cantimpré adds that the rational soul is able to know what is above it (i.e.,
God), close to it (i.e., the angels and itself), and below it (i.e., all the things that are kept
by the circle of heaven). In a passage very similar to Bartholomew’s, Thomas remarks
that affections arise from the concupiscible and irascible powers, and that the rational
power is responsible for all the senses of the soul and all the other affections. Thomas
broadens the account of  the concupiscible and irascible powers to explain how the
affections, which these powers generate, are also like the cause and common matter of
every  vice  and  virtue  (THOMAS  CANTIMPRATENSIS,  LDNR,  2.4).  Some  chapters  later,  he
carries on the discussion of these three powers of the soul, pointing out that the soul is
not to be understood as divided, but instead as simple and one (LDNR, 2.9).
9 Vincent of Beauvais revisits the « Platonic » distinction as well, scattering its content in
several  books.  In  the  first  book  on  the  soul  (23),  he  connects  desire,  fear  and
discernment  with  the  three  Platonic  powers  of  the  soul  (though he  uses  the  term
cupiditas when dealing with the concupiscible power) (VINCENTIUS BELVACENTIS, SN, 23.14).
In the book on the « sensitive soul » (25), he offers a description of the rational power,
to some extent with the same words as Thomas in De natura rerum (SN,  25.1)12. Like
Thomas, he draws on the account of the De spiritu et anima about the origin of vices and
virtues in the concupiscible and irascible powers. Since virtue is the state of a well-
ordered mind, the affections of the soul are also to be regulated. Otherwise, it  falls
easily on vices (SN, 25.1). Neoplatonic considerations are found also in the book about
the « rational soul » (27).  Vincent explains that human beings are composed of two
substances: the soul with its reason and the body with its senses. The senses are not
able to move the flesh without the soul; the soul instead can move its reason without
the  flesh.  This  passage  repeats  succinctly  the  division  of  the  soul  into  rational,
concupiscible and irascible, and with their relationship to the capacity for knowledge
and affections (SN, 27.1; cf. 25.1). In the next chapter, Vincent affirms that the ability to
desire things that are agreeable and useful and to flee from things that are hurtful
corresponds  to  a  classification  of  the  animal  potency  and  the  sensitive  powers
regarding the conservation of the body: The soul has to judge what can be harmful and
what can be useful, before it comes to the actual desire or flight. This is accomplished
along a path from the senses to the intelligible (or, through the sensitive soul, from
experience to science) (SN, 27.2)13.
 
The Aristotelian distinction: anima vegetabilis, sensibilis, rationalis
10 According Aristotle, « to be alive is to possess a self-originating tendency toward an
end ». The end of the lowest level, the nutritive soul, is to generate another being like
itself; and its primary function is nutrition. Like plants, animals nourish and reproduce,
but, unlike plants, they also sense, move, and desire. Human beings, in addition, are
endowed with reason, by means of which they can order their desires (PETERS - MACE,
2006: 118–119; see also CORCILIUS, 2015: 32–49). This threefold distinction, reworked to a
certain  extent  in  the  Avicennian  account  of  the  soul  and  its  powers,  is  easy  to
appreciate in Albert the Great’s De homine (written about 1242–3)14, and also plays a role
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in the Summa de anima of John of La Rochelle15. Both works were important sources for
Vincent of Beauvais.
11 The Aristotelian notion is at the base of Bartholomew’s account of the three potencies
of the soul with regard to its acts: vegetative in plants and roots, sensitive in animals,
and rational in humans (DPR, 3.7.2-7). The vegetative potency strives after being, the
sensitive after being in the sense of good and the rational after being in the sense of the
best. Consequently, the rational potency does not rest until it unites with God (DPR,
3.13.75-82).  Bartholomew,  resorting  to  the  « treatise  of  the  soul  » in  the  Liber
introductorius of Michael Scot (c. 1175-1237(?))16, explains that the vegetative potency
also has powers of its own: the generative power (responsible for the multiplication of
the  species),  the  nutritive  power  (responsible  for  individual  conservation),  and the
augmentative  power  (responsible  for  the  perfection of  the  subject).  The  appetitive,
digestive, retentive and expulsive virtues serve the nutritive soul, given that they are
responsible for nutrition in general (DPR, 3.8.2-14).
12 Thomas touches upon this theme when referring to the five inner senses (see below).
He states that some bodies live, such as trees, herbs and everything which grows from
earth, while some bodies sense and live, including all brute animals that have sensation
but no imagination, and other bodies—namely, those endowed with the rational soul—
have sense, imagination and memory (LDNR, 2.15).
13 The « Aristotelian » distinction plays a major role in Vincent’s encyclopaedia: the order
of four of the books on the soul conforms roughly with the division into the vegetative,
sensitive, and rational souls (see Appendix 3). This distinction seems to be fundamental
for explaining  the  being  of  the  soul  and  its  relationship  with  the  body.  A  clear
definition of  these  powers  can be  found in  a  brief  passage,  which affirms that  the
« philosophers » single out the powers of the soul according to its operation, depending
on whether it concords with or differs from the operation of the soul of plants and
brute animals. The result of this comparison is the division into vegetative, sensitive
and  rational  powers  (SN,  27.2).  Vincent  draws  on  this  distinction  at  length  when
discussing the substance of the soul in book 23; it appears initially in the exposition
about the different views on the origin and development of the soul (SN, 23.11). Later
on, he takes up Aristotle’s idea of the generation of the three powers of the soul. At first
the human body is animated in the maternal womb, then appears the faculty of sense,
and finally,  the intellect.  These three potencies are not to be conceived of as three
distinct incorporeal substances, but instead as one (SN, 23.14). An « actor » passage17 (in
fact a quotation of La Rochelle) examines the vegetative, sensitive and rational powers
in greater detail  in the next chapter,  in which he explains why some authors have
considered the three powers as three souls. He clarifies that, although there are three
different  incorporeal  substances,  there  is  only  one  single  soul.  The  vegetative  and
sensitive substances exist in the human beings as material dispositions for the purposes
of  the  rational  soul (SN,  23.15).  There  is  another  important  difference  to  consider,
namely,  that  the  sensitive  substance,  and  not  the  rational  one,  is  corruptible.  The
sensitive soul is not corruptible, however, with regard to its essence and potency. It can
be corrupted only with regard to its act, when the soul is separated from the body (SN,
23.15). The sensitive power in human beings is also different from the same power in
brute  animals.  In  animals,  the  soul,  as  a  substantial  and  incorporeal  form,  is  not
distinguishable from the body, neither in potency nor in act. Because humans have a
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rational soul, the sensitive power can be differentiated from the rational with respect
to its act, not to its potency (SN, 23.16).
14 Some of these subjects are iterated later, when discussing the medium for the union
between the human body and soul in another « actor » passage (also a long quotation
from La Rochelle). The sensitive, like the rational soul, is simple and incorporeal—and,
like the body, corruptible. Its simplicity is shown by the fact that the soul can draw the
forms  (species)  away  from  matter,  which  are  the  basis  for  knowledge.  To  be
cognoscitive, the sensitive soul has to correspond with the body as well as with the
rational soul. To make possible the union between body and soul, there is need for a
first  form  that  joins  matter  without  a  medium,  and  a  last  form  that  joins  matter
through a medium. At every stage, the lower soul is considered a sort of « material
disposition »  for  the  superior soul;  and,  at  the  same  time,  the  superior  soul  is
considered the perfection of the lower soul. Thus, the vegetative soul is the medium
through which the sensitive soul joins matter. The sensitive soul is itself a medium for
others joining together: It needs the vegetative power to join its subject, and it itself is
the  final  perfection  in  brute  animals.  In  human  beings,  however,  it  is  merely  the
medium for the constitution of the intelligible power or rational soul (SN, 23.46).
15 Vincent examines in greater detail still the medium character of the sensitive and the
vegetative souls in the next chapter,  a « philosopher » (La Rochelle) quotation18.  An
intermediate is necessary since there is an important disparity between the rational
soul and the body. The rational soul is simple, not contrary (for it is not composed of
opposites), incorporeal, has the ability to know and does not depend for its being on
something exterior to it. The body, by contrast, is by nature composed, contrary (for it
is composed of opposites), corporeal, passive, and dependent on the soul. For this part
of the soul, there are two intermediaries: the vegetative and the sensitive souls. Both
are simple, not contrary, incorporeal, and dependent, but they differ in their ability to
know  and  in  the  way  they  are  united  with  matter.  The  sensitive  soul  needs  the
vegetative, through which it can be united to matter and operate. It also needs the
rational soul, which guides it (in human beings). There are, furthermore, two bodily
intermediaries, by means of which the union is accomplished. The first intermediary is
the spirit, which is of the same nature as the heavenly bodies, and acts as a vehicle for
the various powers of the soul,  namely,  the natural,  vital,  and animal.  The spirit  is
conceived of as simple, not contrary, corporeal, passive, and dependent. The second
intermediary on the part of the body is in the nature of the elements, and concerns
uniformity and moderation, which is in the blood. This is simple, contrary, corporeal,
passive and dependent (SN, 23.47)19. Thus, the rational soul and the body are connected
by the sensitive soul, the vegetative soul, the spirit, and the nature of the elements (for
the spirit and the « natural, vital, and animal powers », see the following section).
16 In book 24, Vincent grounds the division of vegetative, sensitive, and rational souls on
their respective manners of desire (appetitus).  In reference to Avicenna, he explains
that the simple substance fulfils its desire externally, for it needs something external to
itself  in  order  to  be  complete.  The vegetative  life  depends on that  essentially.  The
sensitive substance also requires  something external  to  itself,  for  it  depends on its
body: its cognitive capacity depends on the appearance or similitude (species) of things.
Rational life, by contrast, does not depend essentially on something external. However,
it  does require the appearance or the similitude of a thing to enable cognition (SN,
24.41). Quoting the 13th century anonymous treatise De anima et potenciis eius, Vincent
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also affirms that  the sensitive  soul  is  distinct  from the rational  soul  because of  its
inability  to  conceive  spiritual  things.  Moreover,  similar  to  the  vegetative  soul,  the
sensitive soul cannot be separated (from the body). He introduces here the distinction
between a  rational  and an intellective  power,  whereby the  latter  is  detached from
thinking with forms (SN, 24.62).
17 The difference between the acts of the tripartite soul is also explained resorting to The
fountain of life (Fons vitae) by the Jewish philosopher Salomon Ibn Gabirol (latinised as
Avencebrol or Avicebron, c. 1021–1058). The action of the vegetative soul is to move the
vegetative parts from the centre to the exterior parts (to vivify) and to reproduce a
thing from a similar thing (to generate). The action of the sensitive soul is to sense the
forms of  the  heavy objects  in  time,  and to  move through space.  The action of  the
rational soul is to sense the subtle forms of the things perceived and to be moved by
them, but not in time or space. The action of intelligence is the apprehension of all the
forms of the things perceived without time or inquiry, without any trouble or cause—
merely to apprehend their essence (SN, 24.62). Although they have distinct operations,
the three parts of the soul act and originate simultaneously, as Albert the Great states
in the Summa De homine (SN, 24.62). Two chapters later, Vincent resorts to Avicenna and
Albert  to  deepen  the  notion  of  the  vegetative  power.  Like  Bartholomew  the
Englishman,  he draws on the nutritive,  augmentative and generative virtues of  the
vegetative  power.  These  virtues  can  also  be  arranged  with  respect to  either  the
individual or the species. The nutritive and augmentative virtues serve the individual,
since the first concerns the renewal of individual matter and the second leads to the
individual’s perfection. The generative virtue strives for the conservation of the form
and of the species (SN, 24.64, quoting Albert the Great).
18 This Aristotelian notion of a tripartite soul is also at the base of the idea that human
beings are situated between brute animals and angels. In this light, Vincent remarks
that animals have merely a sensitive soul and angels a purely rational soul. Only human
beings have a substantive soul, which continues to live once it has left its body (SN,
23.26, quoting Alexander of Halès).
 
The « medical » distinction: vis naturalis, vis vitalis, vis animalis20
19 The natural, vital and animal powers are another answer to the question concerning
how the soul operates in the body. These powers are related with the “pneuma” theory,
whose  origins  hark  back  to  Greek  natural  philosophy.  Crucial  for  the  further
development  of  this  theory,  was  the  “pneumatic  physiology”  of  Galen.  Galen
distinguished between a vital pneuma operating in the heart and a psychic pneuma
operating in the brain. The psychic pneuma, which moves from the brain ventricles
through the nerves to the rest of the body, provides sensation and voluntary motion
(ROCCA,  2012:  636-637).  The  localisation  of  the  faculties  of  thought,  judgement,  and
memory  in  the  brain  ventricles  is  usually  attributed  to  Posidonius,  a  4th century
Byzantine physician (SUDHOFF, 1913: 11). Versions of ventricular theories can be found
in Augustine’s (†430) De Genesi ad litteram (GREEN, 2003: 149) and in the treatise De natura
hominis by Nemesius of Emesa (written 390–400) (THEISS, 1997: 41-42; GREEN, 2003: 139;
DOBLER,  2000:  30–31).  Nemesius  was  an  important  source  for  the  Syrian  theological
writer Yanah ibn Mansur ibn Sarjum (latinised as John of Damascus, †749) (LIESER, 1928:
147-148).  In  the  late  ninth  and  tenth  centuries,  ventricular  theories  of  the  inner
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faculties  are  adopted  and  further  developed  by  the  Nestorian  Christian
Hunayn ibn Ishaq al-Ibadi (latinised  as  “Johannitius,”  †873/77 )  and  Qusta  ibn  Luqa
(known as Costa ben Luca, †923) and the Persian physicians Abū Bakr Muḥammad ibn
Zakaryā ar-Rāzī (better known as Razi or Razhes, †925) and Ali ibn al-Abbas al-Majusi
(latinised as Haly Abbas or Ali Abbas) (†994/95) (cf. ROCCA, 2012: 647-648; HARVEY, 1975:
10-11; 13-21). These texts appear to connect the Aristotelian distinction of three souls
or parts of the soul (nutritive or vegetative, sensitive or animal and rational) with the
function of three kinds of “spirits” (ROCCA, 2012: 651). Thus, Haly Abbas maintains that
the nutritive powers of the soul act through the natural spirit, which has its seat in the
liver and the veins.  It  governs generation, nutrition, and growth. The vital  spirit  is
located in the heart, from where it disperses through the arteries to animate the body.
Sensation takes place through the sense organs and the nerves coming to the front of
the  brain.  The  spinal  cord  and  the  nerves  branching  from  it  are  responsible  for
movement.  The ruling power comprises imagination, cognition, and memory. These
faculties are located respectively in the two front ventricles, the middle ventricle, and
the hindmost ventricle of the brain (HARVEY, 1975: 17).
20 These elaborations of the pneuma-ventricular theory came to be known to the “Latin
West”.  Of  considerable  influence  were  the  adapted  translations  by  Constantine  the
African (†1087) of the work of Johannitius known as Isagoge and of the work of Haly
Abbas  called  the  Pantegni.  The  thoughts  of  these  medical  writings  were  further
transmitted through 12th century authors such as William of St. Thierry, Adelard of
Bath, William of Conches, Bernardus Silvestris, and even Hugh of St. Victor (MEIER, 2003:
162-163; JORDAN, 1990: 47; BRUYN, 1982: 67-68; JACQUART, 1986: 209; JACQUART, 2011). The
contemporary Pseudo-Augustinian treatise De spiritu et anima refers to the vis naturalis,
vis vitalis, vis animalis in connexion with an active principle in the organisms, and to the
doctrine of the brain chambers (NORPOTH, 1971: 109–114). Both ideas have an important
place in diverse encyclopaedias up to the middle of the 13th century (cf. MEIER, 2002:
182–183), including the encyclopaedias analysed here.
21 According to Bartholomew the Englishman, who was largely inspired on this subject by
Michael Scot’s « treatise on the soul »21,  there is a « sensitive motive virtue » (virtus
sensibilis motiva), which is divided into natural, vital, and animal powers. The natural
power moves the four humours in the animal body through the veins. It is located in
the liver. The vital virtue, which has its seat in the heart where the arteries originate,
moves the spirit from the heart through the arteries. The animal virtue is situated in
the ventricles of the brain, where all the nerves begin. It moves all the members. This
power is called operative when it moves the hands, and progressive when it extends to
the feet,  enabling the  body to  walk  (DPR,  3.12.2-23).  A  shorter  description of  these
powers ascribes the actions of the vegetative soul (to generate, nourish and grow) to
the natural power (DPR, 3.14.3-16). The function of the vital virtue is to animate the
body (DPR, 3.15.2-5). The animal virtue is threefold: ordinative, sensitive and motive.
The  ordinative  power  orders  the  faculties  of  fantasy  or  imagination  in  the  first
ventricle of the brain, the faculties of judgement (estimatio) and reason in the middle
ventricle, and the faculty of memory and its actions in the last ventricle. In this way,
the  imagination  transmits  what  it  has  formed  and  imagined  to  the  judgement  of
reason. Reason judges and defines what has been transmitted by the imagination, and
then transfers it to memory. Memory receives what has been put « in the intellect »
(reason),  keeps  it  and  guards  it  until  it  is  needed  for  action  (DPR,  3.16.2-15).  The
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sensitive  power  refers  to  the  senses:  The  animal  spirit  expands  from  the  anterior
ventricle of the brain, through delicate nerves, until it forms vision, smell or the other
senses—depending on where the spirit is directed (DPR, 3.16.16-21). The motive power
is not further explained. 
22 Following a  description of  the  five  outer  senses,  Bartholomew deepens  his  account
about  the  spirit.  Resorting  to  Costa  ben  Luca’s  De  differentia  animae  et  spiritus,  he
explains that the spirit is a certain subtle body, generated by the force of heat. Through
the veins and arteries, the spirit gives breath, life and pulse to animals; through the
nerves  and  muscles,  it  brings  about  voluntary  movement  (DPR,  3.22.9-16).  Further
material on the origin of this spirit is offered by « the physicians » (Constantine the
African): When a great ebullition takes place in the liver, caused by the heat that acts in
the  veins,  a  certain  fume  is  released.  It  is  thereby  made  purer  and  clearer,  and
transformed into a pure and spiritual substance: the natural spirit, which refines the
blood and drives and moves the members. This spirit is then directed to the heart. As a
result of its movements, the spirit is further purified, adopts an even purer nature,
transforming into the vital spirit. It spreads from the heart through the arteries to all
the members of  the body,  regulating and restraining them. Some arteries originate
from the heart, one of which divides into three branches. The middle branch reaches
the brain, enabling the spirit to enter the ventricles, where it is further refined and
purified  and  thus  transformed  into  the  animal  spirit  (DPR,  3.22.16-46).  Here  the
doctrine  of  the  three  brain  cells  is  reiterated:  The  animal  spirit,  generated  in  the
anterior  chamber,  spreads  through the  sense organs.  A  part  that  remains  in  these
ventricles brings about the common sense and the imaginative virtue (imagination) in
the frontal ventricles, the intellect (equated with reason?) in the middle ventricle or
logistic cell, and the impressions of these two cells are deposited in the « memory cell »
(DPR, 3.22.47-55). After recapitulating the activity of the spirit, Bartholomew clarifies,
quoting  the  Pseudo-Augustinian  treatise De  spiritu  et  anima ,  that  the  spirit  is  an
instrument of the soul, but not the soul itself (anima) nor the rational mind (animus)
(DPR, 3.22.65-68). The spirit makes it possible for the soul to unite with the body; if the
spirit is disturbed, the harmony between soul and body is severed (DPR, 3.22.70-75). The
book on the soul closes with an examination of the effects of the spirit on the pulse
(DPR, 3.23-24). The activity of the soul along the division into vital, natural, and animal,
and the existence of three chambers in the brain is revised again in the fifth book of De
proprietatibus, which is devoted to anatomy (DPR, 5.1; 5.3; cf. also MEIER, 2003: 162–163).
23 The doctrine of the spirit is also found at the end of Thomas of Cantimpré’s book on the
soul,  based on De spiritu et  anima of Pseudo Alcher of Clairvaux / Pseudo-Augustine
(LDNR,  2).  Concurring  with  the  doctrine  of  the  spirit,  Thomas  explains  how  the
« igneous power » (vis ignea) ascends from the heart to the brain, where it is purified
and cleansed. From the brain it advances and reaches the exterior through the eyes,
ears,  nose and the other instruments of  the senses.  Afterwards,  this igneous power
moves from the forebrain to the hindbrain, from where it descends through the neck
and the spinal cord. In this way it spreads through the body (LDNR, 2.15, still based on
De  spiritu  et  anima).  This  power  builds  also  the  imagination  within  the  « imagining
chamber »  (cella  phantastica).  The  imagination  moves  from  the  forebrain  to  the
midbrain, where it joins the substance of the rational soul (in human beings). In brute
animals, the imagination does not transcend the imagining chamber (LDNR,  2.15). In
another passage borrowed from the same Pseudo-Augustinian work, Thomas clarifies
that the spirit is an inferior power of the soul. It is located in the mind, where the
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similitudes of the corporeal things are represented. Through the spirit we can know the
face of someone in memory, because memory has a similar image (of this face). We
recur to this image when we think about it with our eyes closed (LDNR, 2.7). Thomas
then turns to  a  description of  memory that  is  based on an Augustinian account of
perception22.
24 Vincent touches briefly upon this distinction in the first book on the soul (23), while
discussing the differences and functions of the vegetative, animal, and rational souls.
The rational soul is equated with the celestial bodies, as it is simple and incorruptible.
There are, nevertheless, bodies that are simple but corruptible, such as the elements.
For this reason, in order for the rational soul to be unified with the body, there has to
be agreement between the sensitive soul, the vegetative soul and the spirit (SN, 23.46).
This  spirit  is  divided into three:  animal  (located in the brain),  vital  (located in the
heart), and natural (located in the liver). These three spirits are of the same nature as
the  heavenly  bodies;  therefore,  they  are  in  constant  motion.  Their  main  members,
namely, the brain, the heart, and the liver, are also in constant motion (SN, 23.46). In an
« actor » passage, Vincent discusses later the different views on the three ventricles
doctrine. According to his reading of Johannitius, from the ordering and composing
power  arises  fantasy  in  the  forehead,  thinking  in  the  brain,  and  memory  in  the
hindbrain. He summarises then the argument of Qusta ibn Luqa's De differentia animae et
spiritus, according to which many thinkers consider the rational soul to be corporeal,
and  briefly  discusses  the  seat  of  reason  in  the  middle  chamber  of  the  head.  With
reference to Avicenna and Al-Ghazzali (latinised as Algazel, 1158–1111), he discusses
different  illnesses  that  obstruct  accidentally  the  operation of  the  soul  in  the  three
chambers of the brain. These chambers correspond to the faculties of fantasy, reason,
and memory (SN, 23.39).
25 Vincent takes up again this subject in more than two thirds of book 24 (chapters 3–60).
Referring to De spiritu et anima, he states that, through these powers the soul is joined to
the body, enabling it to live. The natural power is common to all animals. It produces
blood and the humours in the liver, which are transmitted through the veins to all the
members. It can be divided into appetitive (desiring what it is necessary for the body),
retentive  (conserving  what  has  been  consumed,  until  digestion  is  carried  out),
expulsive (expelling what is harmful or superfluous), and distributive (distributing the
good humours of the aliments to all  the members)23.  The vital power resides in the
heart. It gives life and vigour to the whole body, as it regulates the heat of the heart
through inhalation and exhalation. As a result of the pure air, it sends purified blood
throughout the whole body by means of the arteries,  also called beating veins.  The
animal power resides in the brain, from where it enables the five senses to thrive. It
also orders speech and the movement of the limbs. The brain has three ventricles: The
senses  arise  from the anterior  ventricle,  movement from the posterior,  and reason
from the middle. These powers are bodily as well as spiritual,  since they come into
being in the body by means of the soul (SN, 24.3)24.
26 Vincent turns to Haly Abbas for an account of the natural power, responsible for the
emergence and maintenance of the individual. The natural power is here divided into
three  further  powers:  generative,  nutritive,  and  nourishing.  The  generative  power,
through  the  transformative  and  the  informative  powers,  originates  and  forms  the
foetus. The nutritive virtue helps the generative virtue, since it is responsible for the
growth of  the foetus.  Its  action ends at  the end of  youth,  that  is,  at  35 years.  The
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nourishing  virtue  assists  the  other  two  by  assimilating  the  food  that  allows  the
transformation and growth of the foetus and, afterwards, of the individual. It is active
until the death of the individual (SN, 24.4; cf. 24-5-10). A further quotation from Haly
Abbas introduces the section on the vital power, responsible for the life itself and for its
source and principle, the heart life begins from the heart and is conveyed through the
arteries to all the members of the body (SN, 24.11). This leads Vincent to a long section
on how to understand life and living beings (SN, 24.12–51), all of which is based on the
Summa halensis. While this work is attributed to Alexander of Halès (c. 1185–1245), it is
in fact a collaborative work25. Four more chapters from this Summa discuss the bodily
functions of the vital power such as respiration, preservation of natural heat and the
causes for its  corruption,  and the division of  vital  power in active and passive (SN, 
24.52-55). Vincent resorts one more time to Alexander to explicate the animal power.
This power comprises three aspects: the mind (mens), the sensitive (perceptive) and the
motive powers. The mind comprises, for its part, also three powers: fantasy, the faculty
of thought (cogitatio), and memory. They are located respectively in the forebrain (in
two  ventricles),  midbrain,  and  hindbrain.  The  function  of  fantasy  is  to  form  and
imagine  things,  and  then  to  pass  them  on  to  the  faculty  of  thought.  This  faculty
considers imagined things with regard, for instance, to their disposition and order. If
anything  about  these  things  should  be  retained,  then  it  is  preserved  by  memory. 
Through the nerves, the brain operates the faculties of sense and motion (SN, 24.56).
27 Vincent also finds the distinction between the « natural, spiritual and animal » powers
in the Dragmaticon philosophiae by William of Conches. In a rather long quotation, he
examines the appetitive, retentive, digestive, and expulsive virtues attributed to the
natural animal powers (SN, 24.57; cf. also 24.58). Another quotation from the same work
presents  the  notion  of  a  moist  fume  that  ascends  from  the  liver  to  the  heart.
Afterwards, it passes through the finest net near the brain, where it is transformed in
the spirit, the proper instrument of the animal soul. This spirit is not to be identified
with the soul. It is merely an instrument of the soul. There are also three chambers in
the anterior, in the middle, and in the posterior part of the brain. In the first chamber,
called fantastic, the soul « sees and comprehends ». In the middle one, called logistic or
rational, the soul distinguishes in itself the living objects, the forms, and the colours
that  have  been  brought  by  the  fantastic  power.  The  third  chamber  is  called
« memorative » since that is where memory operates. The soul attracts (the exterior
forms) through the first chamber, distinguishes them in the middle chamber, and then
transmits them to memory through an orifice that exists between the middle and the
posterior chambers (SN, 24.59).
28 A collection of citations about memory in book 27 makes also reference to Constantine
the  African  and  the  three  cells  doctrine.  The  mind  has  three  operations:  fantasy,
reason, and memory. They are located in the brain, whose parts and arrangement are
discussed in some detail. The two front ventricles dry up this area and make room in
the brain for the animal spirit, from where the senses and fantasy originate. This spirit
passes to the place in the middle of the brain. From there the animal spirit, now made
more pure and clear than the spirit that came to the front of the brain, transits to build
reason and intellect. Around the middle ventricle there is a part of the brain matter
called pinea, which is similar to a worm. This part of the brain regulates an opening,
through which the animal spirit transits from the forebrain to the hindbrain. It opens
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only to remember things that have been forgotten, or to retain what we do not want to
forget (SN, 27.12).
29 When  considering  the medical  division  in  all  these  records,  we  are  principally
confronted with the notion of spirit as a critical and crucial explanatory concept for the
activity of the soul in the body. This notion also plays a major role on the explanation
of perception. The spirit is considered to have a substance, though a substance that is
airy and purified. Its activity is thus material. According to this view, the powers of the
soul in the body are ultimately physical and, because of their physicality, able to act
upon the body.
 
Avicenna’s faculty psychology: The motive powers (concupiscible or
irascible powers)
30 The philosophical  writings of  the Persian polymath Ibn Sina (latinised as Avicenna,
980–1037), reached the Latin West even before the complete works of Aristotle were
known.  Besides  The  Canon  of  Medicine,  his  other  most  popular  book  was  the
philosophical  encyclopaedia  The  Book  of  Healing  (the  Shifâ).  This  book  originally
comprised four parts:  logic,  philosophy of nature or physics,  mathematics,  and first
philosophy or metaphysics. The Liber sextus de naturalibus sive de anima, the sixth book
of the physics, was one of the three books of this writing that were known in the Latin
West (DE LIBERA, 2005: 22–23). De anima exposes a widely held account of the soul and its
powers.  According  to  this  theory,  which  synthesises  Aristotelian  and  Neoplatonic
aspects, the faculties of the sensitive soul are divided into motive and apprehensive
powers.  The motive power has two functions:  to command behaviour and to effect
movements.  The  latter  function operates  by  means  of  the  nervous  system and the
muscles (KNUUTTILA, 2004: 219–220). The commanding motive faculty can be
concupiscible (desiring pleasurable things or things useful for achieving pleasurable
things) or irascible (desiring to defeat adversaries or to repel harmful or destructive
things).  Actions  of  animals  are  only  partially  guided  by  the  commanding  motive
powers. They also have « instinctual behavioural patterns which are directly actualized
by certain imaginations  and evaluations,  such as  releasing themselves  from a trap,
building  nests,  and  taking  care  of  their  offspring »  (KNUUTTILA, 2004:  222) 26.  The
apprehensive powers comprise the five external senses and the five internal faculties.
In addition, there are intellectual apprehensive faculties, also encompassing powers of
knowing and acting (KNUUTTILA, 2004: 219–220). I will address the apprehensive powers
later in this paper. Avicenna’s psychology plays an important role both in John of La
Rochelle’s Summa de anima27 and Albert’s the Great De homine, the two contemporary
sources most used by Vincent of Beauvais about the powers of the soul.
31 Avicenna’s account of the soul is also displayed in our encyclopaedias. For instance,
Bartholomew the Englishman draws on a similar distinction between apprehensive (or
ordinative) and motive powers in several passages. Nonetheless, this doctrine is most
frequently  referred  to  in  the  Speculum  naturale,  whether  directly  or  via  John of  La
Rochelle or Albert the Great. Thus, at the beginning of the book on the sensitive soul
(SN 25), an « actor » passage reflects on the powers of the soul as divided into sense and
affection, that is to say, into cognitive and affective or into apprehensive and motive
powers (SN, 25.1). Near the end of this book, Vincent refers to Avicenna’s account of the
motive power, which, like the apprehensive, is twofold: it both orders movement and
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executes it. The appetitive power commands the motive power, which in turn is divided
into the concupiscible and irascible, depending on whether it orders the body to move
towards what is thought to be good, or to avoid what is thought to be hurtful (SN, 
25.101).  He  turns  to  Albert  the  Great  for  a  more  detailed  description  of  the
concupiscible  power:  It  is  characteristic  of  the  sensitive  soul  and its  function is  to
command the movement that acquires what is agreeable. In human beings, in contrast
to  animals,  reason  directs  the  concupiscible  and  irascible  powers  (SN,  25.101).  In
reference to John of La Rochelle, Vincent states that the motive power can be divided
into unconscious (virtus motiva modo naturali) and conscious striving (virtus motiva modo
animali). The unconscious striving is not governed by reason and it is not guided by
perception (non secundum apprehensionem); the conscious striving, by contrast, follows
the comprehension of good and bad (SN, 25.102). The motive power is thus related with
the  natural  and  animal  powers.  Another  quotation  from  La  Rochelle  differentiates
between the commanding motive powers and the dispositions towards motion.  The
commanding motive powers are subdivided into appetitive, affective, and the forces
that move the bodily members. The dispositions are related to two of the inner senses
(see  below).  Depending  on  the  « sensible  forms »  presented  by  fantasy  and  on  the
« intentions of sensible things », we are able to discern good or bad and, subsequently,
move towards or away from something (SN, 25.103). This book closes with a chapter on
the different kinds of exterior movements that respond to the affective powers (LIESER,
1928: 150–152). La Rochelle’s account about unconscious (modo naturali) or conscious
movement (modo animali) is resumed in the book on the rational soul, where it opens
the  examination  of  « intellectual  movement ».  The  conscious  movement  strives  for
ephemeral  goods.  It  is  guided by  reason,  and develops  in  the  concupiscible,  in  the
irascible, or in the power that moves the members (SN, 27.56)28.
 
Sensation, Perception, and Knowledge29
32 All soul schemes address the union of the soul with the body. « Cognition », as we have
seen, has a more or less important place in all of the soul’s divisions. It is frequently
referred to as an activity in which body and soul concur, since the soul must receive
impressions, which are collected in the body or in the bodily organs, in order to be
cognisant of the world. This ability results in actions towards what is desired and away
from what is feared.
33 If we are to consider specific cognitive faculties or the path leading from sensation to
knowledge, we find in the encyclopaedias two principal descriptions: The first studies
the path from sensation to wisdom (or to God),  the second from sensation through
perception to knowledge.
 
From sensation to wisdom
34 Already Calcidius (fl. c. 400) in his commentary on Timaeus and Boethius (c. 480/85–
524/26)  in  his  Consolatio  philosophiae offered  a  list  of  cognitive  faculties 30.  Similar
cognitive faculties were the subject of 12th century anagogical literature, the aim of
which was to prepare the individual for contemplation (NÉMETH, 2013:  33).  Different
schemes  leading  from  sensation  or  sensuality  to  intellect  or  intelligence  via
imagination and / or reason were formulated by authors such as Abelard (1079–1142),
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Thierry of Chartres (c. 1085–c. 1155), William of Conches, Richard (†1173), and Godfrey
of Saint-Victor (c. 1125–1195). In some of the writings by Hugh of Saint-Victor (c. 1097–
1141),  Isaac of Stella (c.  1100–1178),  and Alain of Lille (c.  1125/30-1203) one finds a
fivefold distinction regarding sensus, imaginatio, ratio, intellectus, and intelligentia31. The
views of Hugh of Saint-Victor and Isaac of Stella were influential for the author of De
spiritu et anima (NÉMETH, 2013: 69). All these schemes have in common that reason is
considered to have a limited cognitive potential, and that the adequate cognition of
God is accomplished « through some supra-rational cognitive faculty ». The definition
of the latter faculty (usually intelligence) varies greatly depending upon the theological
anthropology of each author (NÉMETH, 2013: 35).
35 Following Bartholomew, who quotes from the Pseudo-Augustinian treatise De spiritu et
anima, there are five powers at issue in the definition of the relation between the soul
and  the  body.  The  first  of  these  is  sensation  (sensualitas).  It  is  responsible  for  the
movement of the body, the senses, and desiring things that are appropriate for the
body. In this passage, sensation assumes the function of the irascible and concupiscible
powers, by means of which the animal moves towards agreeable things and away from
harmful  ones.  The second power is  sense (sensus).  Through sense the soul  acquires
knowledge of the sensible and corporeal things when they are present. The third is
imagination (imaginatio), by means of which the soul can see the forms of the corporeal
things when they are absent. The fourth is reason (ratio), which discerns between good
and bad, truth and falsehood. The fifth is intellect (intellectus), which comprehends not
material things but rather intelligible things such as God and angels. The first three
powers respond to the unibility of the soul with the body; they give life to the body, and
enable the interior and exterior senses to attain their completion. These powers are
common  to  human  beings  and  brute  animals.  Reason  and  intellect,  however,
correspond to the capacity of the soul to separate from the body and to continue to
exist, like the angels. This is accomplished in two ways: by the intellect considering the
higher things, and reason the lower things (DPR, 3.6.7-32).
36 This fivefold model  is  often referred to in Thomas’s  Liber  de  natura rerum,  which is
largely based on the Pseudo-Augustinian treatise. Thomas explains that, although the
soul is merely one, it has different properties or capacities. Included are sense (sensus),
imagination  (imaginatio),  reason  (ratio),  intellect  (intellectus),  and  intelligence
(intelligentia). In the same manner as the visible world is ordered according to a fivefold
order (i.e. earth, water, air, firmament, and empyrean or higher heaven), there are for
the soul in its bodily existence five stages in the progression towards wisdom (LDNR,
2.4). The only one of these five stages that connects with the external world is sense,
for the connatural faculty to sense follows necessarily from the existence of the outer
world.  Imagination  and  reason  are  thought  of  as  interior.  Imagination  is  based  on
sensible things. Reason is the rational spirit that, since it is a gift of God, is apt to know
the  truth  and  to  love  the  good  (LDNR,  2.8).  Intellect  and  intelligence  are  superior,
because  God  is  also  fire  and  light.  The  light  sends  out  from  itself  its  splendour,
retaining some light in itself. In this way, intelligence is illuminated for the knowledge
of the truth. Fire also sends out heat from itself, but it does not lose it, and kindles
affection and love for virtue. Just as the eye needs the outer light of the sun to see, so
does intelligence require the divine light (LDNR, 2.8).
37 These five stages can also be divided according to reason. Below reason are the things
that we perceive through the senses, such as hard and soft, white and black. Close to
Ordering the Soul. Senses and Psychology in 13th Century Encyclopaedias
RursuSpicae, 3 | 2020
14
reason  and  open  to  it  are  the  things  that  we  perceive  through  reason,  such  as
convenient and inconvenient, truth and falsehood, just and unjust. Reason itself is a
certain movement of the soul (animus),  which arouses the sense of the mind (sensus
mentis) and distinguishes truth from falsehood. Above reason are things upon which
prevails  neither  sense nor reason,  such as  things that  are  understood by means of
divine revelation or  believed based on the authority  of  the  Scriptures,  such as  the
Trinity. Since God is the sum of all things and therefore nothing singular, He cannot be
subject to the movements of reason, for reason is concerned with individual matters
(LDNR, 2.8). In the same chapter, Thomas delves further into the five activities of the
soul. Like Bartholomew, he describes the senses as perceiving present forms, and the
imagination as receiving the corporeal forms of corporeal things that are absent. The
imagination  thus  originates  from  the  senses  and  varies  according  to  them;  it  is,
however,  an  interior  faculty.  Reason  perceives  the  natures,  forms,  differences,
attributes and accidents of the corporeal things. These things are incorporeal; they are
beyond matter and their existence is dependent on reason. Through reason, the things
which originate in the concrete things are drawn away from them: It is not the thing
itself that is the object of reason, but the nature of it, according to which every thing is
what it is. The intellect perceives the invisible things, like angels, demons and every
spirit  that has been created. Intelligence is immediately below God, comprehending
Him as real and really immutable. With respect to their objects, then, it can be stated
that the soul perceives the corporal objects by means of the senses, their similitudes by
means of  the imagination,  their  natures by means of  reason,  the created spirits  by
means of the intellect, and the uncreated spirit by means of intelligence. Yet Thomas
also names seven different powers of the soul and their activity: The sense perceives,
the  imagination  represents,  the  faculty  of  reasoning  (cogitatio)  forms,  the
understanding (ingenium) investigates, reason judges, memory preserves, intelligence
comprehends  and  brings  to  meditation  or  contemplation.  He  specifies  that  the
understanding investigates unknown things, while reason distinguishes the things that
have been found and memory stores the things that have been judged, offering other
objects for judgement. Thus, there is a hierarchy from the lowest to the highest. In the
faculty of reason, in addition, there is something that tends towards the celestial and
heavenly, which is called wisdom (sapientia). There is also something that concerns the
transitory  and  ephemeral,  which  is  called  prudence  (prudentia)  (LDNR,  2.8).  In  the
following chapter, one finds a similar enumeration, this time of six powers—namely,
sense, imagination, reason, memory, intellect and intelligence (LDNR, 2.9). Another list
of the cognitive powers of the soul describes them as degrees of corporal life, which are
arranged  according  to the  image  of  higher  life.  This  list  considers  sensation
(sensificatio), imagination, memory, and providence as a similitude of reason. The fourth
degree (providence) mingles with the Platonic idea of the concupiscible and irrational
soul (LDNR, 2.10).
38 In an « actor passage » of the first book on the soul (actually, a quotation from Pseudo-
Augustine’s De spiritu et anima), Vincent mentions a similar fivefold distinction when
explaining how the body works:  The body is  composed of  organs;  these organs are
composed, in turn, of uniform parts; these uniform parts are composed of humours; the
humours are composed of foods, and the foods of elements. Nevertheless, none of these
correspond to  the  soul,  even though the  soul  acts  in  these  « organs ».  If  these  are
unregulated and unordered in their life, the soul withdraws, dragging everything away
with  it,  that  is,  sense  (sensus),  imagination  (imaginatio),  reason  (ratio),  intellect
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(intellectus),  intelligence  (intelligentia),  and  also  concupiscibility  and  irascibility  (SN,
23.60). In discussing the rational soul, he asserts that the powers of the soul are divided
differently  by  different  authors.  Quoting  John  of  La  Rochelle32,  he  summarises  the
account  of John  of  Damascus,  who  distinguishes  between  cognitive  and  life-giving
(zoticae)  powers.  The cognitive powers are intellect,  opinion,  imagination and sense
(sensus). The life-giving correspond to the Platonic appetitive powers (SN, 27.2). Some
chapters  later,  the  cognitive  powers  correspond  to  the  « fivefold  division »:  sense,
imagination, reason, intellect, intelligence.
39 Like Bartholomew and Thomas, Vincent also resorts to Pseudo-Augustine’s De spiritu et
anima to expound the idea of a fivefold progression from sensation to wisdom. Near the
opening of the book on the animal soul (25), he states that to ascend from the lower to
the  higher  it  is  necessary  to  come  across  sense,  imagination,  reason,  intellect,
intelligence. Only then can the utmost faculty of wisdom be attained (SN, 25.2). Vincent
describes the operation of these faculties using similar, and even the same terms used
by  Thomas  (SN,  25.2;  cf.  LDNR 2.8).  Accordingly,  he  reiterates  that  this  distinction
corresponds  to  the  fivefold  division  of  the  visible  world  (SN,  25.1).  Quoting  also
« Hugo » (De spiritu et anima), and in contrast to Thomas’s adaptation, he considers the
senses  and  the  imagination  (sensus,  imaginatio)  to  be  exterior  powers,  and  reason,
intellect, and intelligence (ratio, intellectus, intelligentia) to be interior powers. Intellect
and intelligence are considered superior (SN, 25.3). Nonetheless, the differentiation of
further  abilities  or  acts  of  the  soul  leads  to  more  progressions.  In  this  way,  the
discussion of the five progressions leads to a discussion of the activities of meditation
and  contemplation,  which  is  taken  up  with  an  exposition  of  reason,  intellect,  and
intelligence (SN, 25.2).
40 In the same chapter, a quotation by John of La Rochelle deepens the description of the
intellective or rational virtue, intellect, and intelligence. With regard to its acts, the
rational  virtue  may  be  called  understanding  (ingenium)  when  it  investigates,
discernment (ratio) when it distinguishes, and memory (memoria) when it is retaining
(SN, 25.2)33. In the next two chapters, Vincent turns to De spiritu et anima for recounting
the powers of the soul and their operation (SN, 25.3)—passages also quoted by Thomas.
As in the Pseudo-Augustinian treatise, Vincent seems to demarcate the apprehensive
and the appetitive powers from the intellective on the basis of their dependency on the
external  world.  Accordingly,  the  soul  has  to  draw  away  all  corporeal  senses  to
understand  the  divine,  God,  or  itself.  Its  appropriate  actions  for  this  purpose  are
meditation,  the  diligent  investigation  of  the  hidden  truth,  and  contemplation,  the
delightful  admiration  of  the  manifest  truth  (SN,  25.4).  Sensation  is  defined  as  the
affection (passio) of the soul in the body, which is incited by external properties. The
imagination  operates  with  the  form  of  the  corporeal  objects,  which  are  no  longer
present.  The  faculty  of  thought  (cogitatio)  is  the  soul’s  occupation  with  anything.
Meditation  is  thought  that  investigates  manner,  cause,  and  reason  of  each  of  the
objects. Inherent to the soul is understanding (ingenium), the soul’s faculty of knowing
itself. Reason is the power to distinguish and judge everything. Intellect is perception
of things that are true. Intelligence is concerned with God. In this way, sense is the
source  of  imagination,  and  the  imagination  of  cognition.  The  faculty of  thought
motivates  understanding,  and  understanding  motivates  reason;  reason  leads  to  the
intellect, intellect to intelligence, and intelligence to contemplation (SN, 25.4).
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41 The fivefold distinction is referred to again in one of the opening paragraphs of the
book  on  the  rational  soul  (SN  27),  where  Vincent  describes  briefly  the  fivefold
distinction of De spiritu et anima (SN, 27.4). At this point, an « actor » passage introduces
the notion of mens according to the Damascene. The operations of the « mind », like the
fivefold distinction as well, comprise the activity of the senses along with attaining the
higher good (SN, 27.4; cf. LIESER, 1928: 163).
42 To conclude this section, one may ask—following Christel Meier-Staubach (MEIER 2003,
180)—whether the anagogical literature of the 12th century and its deliberations about
the path leading from sensation to God contributed to the reception and understanding
of the Avicennian writings, which I will be dealing with in the following section.
 
Avicenna’s faculty psychology: inner senses, intellect, and
abstraction
43 As already stated,  a  significant  source  for  understanding sensation,  perception and
knowledge in the compendia (above all in Speculum naturale) is Avicenna’s De anima.
According to this treatise, the impressions of the five outer senses are processed and
abstracted  by  means  of  five  inner  senses  or  faculties:  common sense,  imagination,
imaginative  (in  animals)  or  cogitative  power  (in  humans),  estimative  power,  and
memory  (DE  LIBERA,  2014:  967).  These  inner  cognitive  faculties  have  two  different
objects:  the  forms,  which  are  apprehended  first  by  the  outer  senses  and  then
transmitted to the inner senses; and the « intentions of the sensory objects », a kind of
content apprehended merely by the inner senses (a recurring example is the lamb’s 
perception of the wolf as a threat) (DE LIBERA, 2014: 968). Common sense is a receptive
instance. In several passages, Avicenna also names this sense fantasy. It integrates all
the data of different sensations, apprehending it simultaneously, and in this manner
transforms « sensation into perception ». It is situated in the first cavity of the brain.
The imagination retains « what [the] common sense permanently receives from the five
senses, after the disappearance of the sensory input in question ». It gives form to two
series of data, one imaginary (in the sense of fantasy, for instance, when we entertain
the form of a straight line that is drawn by a falling water drop), and the other real. It is
located in the cavity of the anterior ventricle of the brain (DE LIBERA, 2014: 968). The role
of the imaginative or cogitative power is « to separate or combine the images retained
by the  imagination,  to  divide  and compose  images ».  Its  seat  is  the  brain’s  central
cavity. The proper object of the estimative power is the « intentions of the sensible
objects »;  its  location  is  the  extremity  of  the  central  cavity  of  the  brain.  Memory,
located  in  the  brain’s  posterior  cavity,  « fulfils  the  same  function  of  retention  in
relation  to  the  estimative  faculty  as  the  imagination  in  relation  to  [the]  common
sense » (DE LIBERA, 2014: 968).
44 Actual knowledge can be attained, though, only by means of the intellect, by which
human  beings  grasp  the  intelligibles.  This  is  called  the  theoretical  intellect,  « in
distinction to the practical intellect, which relies on the body » (HASSE, 2000: 175). The
intellect, the theoretical faculty, shifts from potentiality to actuality by means of four
different relationships to the intelligibles, characterised by four different degrees of
actualisation (HASSE, 2000: 183). All humans after birth have an intellect in the form of
intellectus materialis; it is predisposed for the reception of intelligible forms, not having
yet  received  them.  An  intellectus  in  habitu has  « primary  intelligibles »:  rational
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processes and principles such as « The whole is bigger than the part » (viz. axiomatic
knowledge). The intellectus in effectu « has acquired secondary intelligibles but does not
consider them at the moment ». The intellectus accomodatus is at work if the intelligible
forms  are  actually  present  in  the  soul;  this  happens  when  the  intellect  in  effectu
« connects with the separately existing active intellect » (HASSE, 2000: 178-179; HARVEY,
1975: 48). This active intellect is the ultimate ground for the appearance of abstract
universal forms in the soul (HASSE, 2000: 175-176). The operation of these four intellects
conforms to the intellection of syllogisms: The second intellect (able to grasp axioms)
and the third (able to apprehend forms whose origin is in sense data) are different
parts of the syllogism. The fourth intellect is the one that actually thinks the syllogism
(HASSE, 2000: 183).
45 In the encyclopaedias of Thomas and Bartholomew, the doctrine of the inner senses
plays a minor role. In some passages of De proprietatibus rerum, Bartholomew seems to
entertain a somewhat idiosyncratic view of this doctrine, based partly on the « treatise
on the soul » of Michael Scot (Liber introductorius). He asserts that the sensitive soul has
its seat in fine brain ventricles and links it to the apprehensive and motive virtues. It
divides the apprehensive power into the common and the exterior sense. The latter
comprises sight, hearing, taste, smell and touch (DPR, 3.9.2-14). In another passage, he
mentions four of the five inner senses: the inner or common sense, the imaginative
power (not distinct from imagination), the estimative power (equated with reason), and
memory. Not only does he not distinguish between imagination and the imaginative or
cognitive power, but he also appears to understand the common sense as composed of
imagination, reason, and memory (DPR, 3.10.2-11, from Iohannitius). In a later account
of the different powers of the soul, based again on the discussion about the soul in the
Liber  introductorius,  he  considers  at  first  the  sense  (described  as  sensation  and  as
common sense), the imaginative virtue (equated to imagination), the estimative virtue
or sensitive reason, and the recollective or retentive power. The estimative virtue is
defined as being common to animals and human beings. It enables human beings to be
prudent  and  sagacious  when  avoiding  the  evil  and  seeking  the  agreeable  (DPR,
3.11.3-20).
46 The doctrine of the five inner senses is clearly visible in Vincent’s book on the sensitive
soul (25), as Christel Meier-Staubach has already shown (MEIER, 2003: 168-173). The first
draft of this book was thoroughly revised and significantly expanded. An analysis of the
differences between the first and the final version, has permitted Monique Paulmier-
Foucart  to  identify  a  « regression »  of  the  medical  division  in  favour  of  the
philosophical one—or, as she explicitly states, from the division into natural, vital and
animal  powers  to  the  division  into  vegetal,  sensible  and  rational  souls  (PAULMIER-
FOUCART,  2000:  281–282;  278–279).  Similarly,  Christel  Meier-Staubach points  out  to  a
« broadening  of  the  soul  problematic »,  which  implies  a  « turnaround »  from  an
Augustinian model to the Aristotelian philosophy of nature, as it  was mediated and
modified by Arabic authors (MEIER, 2003: 166). This turnaround is better understood if
considering the  different  divisions  of  the  soul  already  examined.  The  Avicennian
account of the soul—as synthesized by John of La Rochelle and Albert the Great—offers
both an alternative explanation of the working of the soul in the body that subsumes in
part the medical pneuma theory, and underscores the path that goes from the sensible
to the intelligible objects through abstraction. As a result,  the Avicennian approach
answers also to the operation of the soul in the body and to the relationship between
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the  senses,  able  to  perceive  material  objects,  and  the  intellect,  able  to  perceive
immaterial objects.
47 This turnaround can be appreciated first if one considers the order of the chapters. As
mentioned  above,  the  first  chapters  concern  the  fivefold  progression  of  the  soul
towards wisdom after De spiritu et anima. These are immediately followed by a number
of passages that discuss abstraction. These serve as a preamble for the description of
the working of the five exterior senses. Towards the end of the book, we find a section
that deals with the inner senses. Vincent cites Avicenna and Aristotle, but more often
John of La Rochelle. The bulk of the quotations, however, is taken from the Summa de
homine of Albert the Great, who refers especially to Avicenna’s De anima. Quotations of
Albert’s  work  appear  primarily  in  the  discussion  of  the  common  sense;  they  are
completely absent from the examination of the estimative power and of memory34.
48 The discussion of abstraction is introduced by a quotation from Aristotle, who in turn
cites  Plato,  who  states  that  we  know  by  means  of  similitude.  The  soul  knows
everything, and everything is known according to its respective principles. Intellect,
science, opinion or estimation, and the sense are concerned with different objects (SN,
25.5).  Correspondingly,  Vincent  examines  the  operation  of  some  of  the  interior
apprehensive  powers,  which  are  proper  to  the  sensitive  soul,  together  with  the
intellect,  which is  proper  to  the  rational  soul.  He  first  refers  to  Avicebron to  help
explain how the sense and intellect receive respectively sensible and intelligible forms.
The sensitive soul grasps the sensible forms without the matter to which these forms
are bound. Intelligence and the soul apprehend the objects through their forms, as they
can be associated with these forms because of the similitude and the agreement with
them with respect to their kind. Since intelligence has no form of its own, but rather
apprehends all forms, it is necessary for intelligence (and for the soul) to be the form of
all things (SN, 25.6). Next, Vincent introduces Avicenna’s view of abstraction: To grasp
something  is  to  apprehend  an  apprehensible  form,  detached  from  matter  by
abstraction. There are different degrees of abstraction and, therefore, also different
abstract forms. These forms have some traits that are accidental, and some that are
essential. In some cases, abstraction from matter is done with some appendages that
adhere  to  the  form on  account  of  matter.  The  sense  (sensus)  requires  matter  to
apprehend the forms, since it operates only in the presence of a material object. The
imagination or  imaginative power grasps this  form as  being significantly  separated
from matter:  A form can remain in the imagination, even if  the actual object is  no
longer present.  Nevertheless,  the separation from matter is not complete,  since the
imagination comprehends the sensible form along with the individual conditions under
which an object was perceived, such as position, appearance, etc. For this reason, the
imagination cannot grasp a form in such a manner that all the individuals of a species
agree with it. A human being is imagined as this particular human being, not as every
human being. The estimative power goes a little bit further in the order of abstraction.
It is capable of apprehending intentions, such as good or bad intentions, which are not
material in themselves. Nevertheless, they are apprehended insofar as they are present
in some material object. Finally, the intellective power is able to apprehend forms that
are not material, not corresponding to material things, and not joined in any way with
matter. It knows the object according to its essence, as it apprehends completely the
intellectual  objects.  Once  devoid  of  all  matter,  of  all  singularity,  an  object  may  be
predicated  of  all  human  beings,  not  just  of  one  (SN,  25.7).  A  quotation  from  La
Rochelle's Summa de anima (actually, a collation of quotes) explains the already known
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twofold differentiation of the cognitive power: It has an understanding with respect to
nature (modo naturali), and another insofar as it has a sensitive soul (modo animali). The
first apprehension occurs by means of fantasy. It is called natural, because its operation
is analogous to the operation of the vegetative power and does not respond to reason.
The animal apprehension, by contrast,  can respond to reason, as it  is patent in the
operation of the common sense. There are exterior and interior apprehensive faculties
(SN, 25.8; cf. also 27.3).
49 Introducing Vincent’s account of the five inner senses is a quotation from Avicenna
that explains how the forms, after having been apprehended by the exterior sense, are
operated upon by some of the interior faculties. Vincent then introduces the common
sense  by  citing  John of  La  Rochelle.  This  sense  operates  in  concert  with  the  outer
senses, « passing » the sensible forms to the imagination and the imaginative power.
Faculties  such  as  the  estimative  power  (estimatio)  and  memory  are  capable  of
comprehending intentions: A sheep recognises, without the assistance of the exterior
sense, the intention of enmity when seeing a wolf, so that it can flee from it (SN, 25.85).
Some  of  these  faculties  apprehend  and  operate  (common  sense,  cogitative  and
estimative powers); some apprehend but do not operate (imagination and memory) (SN,
25.85).  The  next  chapter  complements  the  working  and  location  of  the  five  inner
apprehending powers according to Avicenna (SN, 25.86), a description quite close to the
one  given  at  the  beginning  of  this  section.  The  exposition  on  the  inner  virtues
concludes with a reiteration of this theme by La Rochelle (SN, 25.86).
50 The next ten chapters (87–96) examine the common sense. In reference to Avicenna,
Vincent repeats the above-mentioned description about the location and functioning of
the common sense (SN,  25.90).  Another  similar  account  is taken from Algazel,  who
stresses that all individual senses are drawn from the common sense; the impression of
the  outer  senses  is  in  turn  communicated  to  the  common  sense (SN,  25.91).  The
common sense works in two ways, as illustrated by a quotation from La Rochelle: First,
it facilitates the exchange between itself and the particular (outer) senses, so that we
are able, for instance, to « see what we hear » or « hear what we see »; second, it unites
the sensations of the various senses, so that we can know that something like sugar is
both white and sweet. It is also called formal because it retains the forms received from
the exterior sense,  even though they are no longer present.  It  also apprehends the
common sensibles such as magnitude, number, repose, etc. (SN, 25.88)35. Moreover, this
faculty is appropriately called « interior » since it works even without the input of the
outer  senses,  for  instance,  when  we  dream  (SN,  25.86).  Because  the  interior  sense
composes  and  divides  the  sensations  of  the  particular  senses,  it  can  deceive  if  its
composition  or  division  does  not  correspond  to  the  sensed  object.  The  particular
senses, by contrast, cannot deceive (SN, 25.96).
51 In  reference  to  Albert’s  De  homine,  some  principal  traits  of  the  common sense  are
exposed once again, some definitions clarified, and some thoughts introduced for the
first  time.  Thus,  the properties  of  « community »  and « centrality »  of  the common
sense account for the unity of an object beyond the manifold sensations (SN, 25.88)36.
No sense on its own can discern the composition or the division of the sensible objects
according to affirmation or negation (i.e., to their truth or falsehood). Only one single
power  can compare,  and then judge what  is  being compared (SN,  25.89)37.  Another
passage seems to adhere to the doctrine of the animal spirit for locating the common
sense. The first cavity of the brain is also the place where the animal spirit is gathered
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together.  Vincent  recapitulates  its  principal  characteristics:  This  faculty  is  called
« common » because it receives all forms, and its proper object is the forms which the
five senses impress upon it. There is a difference between sensation and the objects of
fantasy  (mere  apparitions)  or  imagination  (images).  Avicenna,  according  to  Albert,
identifies  common  sense  and  fantasy,  because  he  comprehends fantasy  somewhat
broadly,  in  a  manner  that  encompasses  both  common  sense  and  imagination  (SN,
25.90). The common sense and the outer senses are then considered in terms of their
primacy:  The  common  sense  cannot  operate  without  the  particular  senses.  In  this
respect,  the  common  sense  is  dependent  on  the  particular  ones.  Nevertheless,  the
common sense resides in the organ from which the animal spirit reaches the organs of
the particular senses. In this regard, the particular senses derive from the common
sense,  which  is  properly  more  primary,  since  it  gathers  in  itself  all  the  particular
sensible things and completes them, for it is able to make a unified composition from
the different impressions (SN, 25.91).
52 A further explanation in the next chapter makes plain that the particular senses are
joined  in  the  common  sense  as  parts  of  an  integral  whole  through  inquisition,
composition, and division. The common sense completes the information carried from
a particular sense and it examines further information from other senses, so that it can
perceive (SN, 25.92). The objects of the common sense are the five common sensibles:
motion, rest, shape, number, and size (SN, 25.94)38. Based on the common sensibles, we
can comprehend such different things as time (a kind of motion and its cause), space (a
kind of size), and a sentence (it corresponds to number, since the voice is air that has
been weakly stroked) (SN, 25.95). There are, as another quotation of Albert shows, three
acts of the common sense: one, an act per se, according to which the common sense
apprehends the « common sensibles »; two, an act per posterius, according to which it is
capable of sensing all the particular senses, since these are in the common sense; and
three,  an  act  per  accidens,  according  to  which  the  acts  of  the  particular  senses
correspond to it (SN, 25.96).
53 Vincent discusses the imagination in two chapters (97–98), in which he quotes De spiritu
et anima,  John of Damascus, and Aristotle. The passage from the Pseudo-Augustinian
treatise discusses the origin of the imagination in the « imagining chamber » and its
movement from the forebrain to the midbrain, where it  joins the rational soul (SN,
25.97). The  passage  of  John  Damascene  further  explains  that  the  imagination  is  a
passion of the irrational soul, and that an apparition (phantasma) is an empty passion,
since it  is  an image that  has  no object  as  a  source (SN,  25.97). Following Aristotle,
everything  that  has  sense  also  has  fantasy  and  appetite  (desire).  Sense  is  either  a
potency (such as sight) or an act (such as the act of seeing). In contrast to imagination,
the sense needs the presence of sensible objects. Therefore, fantasies are often false,
and senses cannot but be true (SN, 25.98; for a similar—in part the same—account, see
SN, 25.5).
54 The  subsequent  passage  on  Aristotle  distinguishes  between  a  sensitive  fantasy  in
irrational creatures, and a desiderative or cognitive fantasy in rational animals. The
being that imagines moves due to the imagined form, whether by the sense (animals) or
by cognition (human beings) (SN, 25.98). Vincent turns to La Rochelle and the idea that
the imagination is  an interior sensitive power.  With regard to the hierarchy of the
powers of the soul, the imagination is above the exterior senses. With regard to the
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order  of  the  acts,  imagination  is  below  the  exterior  senses,  since  the  senses  are
necessary for there to be imagination (SN, 25.98).
55 The  estimative  power  comprises  only  one  chapter,  one  quotation  from  John  of  La
Rochelle,  according to whom this power is  located in the upper part of  the middle
ventricle  of  the  brain.  It  apprehends  the  « intentions  of  the  sensible  things ».  Its
understanding is immaterial, for it concerns the accidents of the sensible objects (for
instance, if they are beneficial or useless). Its operation has three forms: on account of
a natural cause, whether as a consequence of an instinct (the sheep’s fear of the wolf)
or as a reflective motion (a baby who is falling try to grasp something); on account of
experience, where also imagination and memory help (a dog fearing the stick, which
has beaten him); and according to similitude, that is, analogies on the basis of what has
already been experienced (for instance, a fruit initially judged as something sweet from
its visual appearance, without having actually been tasted) (SN, 25.99)39.
56 Vincent  dedicates  one  chapter  to  memory  (SN,  25.100).  This  chapter  opens  with  a
quotation from La Rochelle, indicating the location and function of the « memorative
power » according to Avicenna. A passage from Pseudo Augustine’s De spiritu et anima
adds  that  memory  retains  received  things,  represents  past  things,  and  recovers
forgotten things. It operates together with reason, because reason needs memory to
move towards the unknown and to retain what is already known (SN, 25.100). Following
Aristotle’s De memoria et reminiscentia, Vincent explains that we know the past through
memory,  and  the  present  through the  senses.  Every  memory  takes  place  after  the
moment  (tempus)  in  which  the  sensible  object  was  originally  sensed  (SN,  25.100)40.
Lieser  notes  that  Vincent’s  exposition  of  the  five  progressions  from  sensation  to
perception  seems  to  reduce  the  five  powers  of  Avicenna  to  the  three  of  John  of
Damascus (LIESER,  1928: 149-150). Nevertheless, this assertion does not apply without
qualification, for the discussion of the intentions does not fit at all in the threefold
scheme of the Damascene. 
57 A further discussion of the inner cognitive faculties appears in the book on the rational
soul (SN, 27). Considerations of the inner senses have their place here, for it is the task
of the intellect (in some quotations equated with reason) to transform perception into
knowledge. Since Vincent has in view a number of different competing explanations,
his  order  is  not  thoroughly  systematic.  A  rough  schema  follows  the  Augustinian
division  into  superior  (mens)  and  inferior  reason  (ratio  vel  intellectus)  (LIESER,  1928:
161-162)—a division also adopted in part by La Rochelle in his Summa (TELLKAMP, 2010:
38)41.
58 In the opening of this book, three different « actor » passages deal with the different
orderings of the powers of the soul. The first explains different manners in which the
soul can be divided (SN, 27.1). The second sheds some light on the many divisions of the
soul which are read in the Pseudo-Augustinian De spiritu et anima (SN, 27.2). In the third,
Vincent explicitly distinguishes between the division of the interior powers according
to  John  of  Damascus  (imagination,  reason,  memory)  and  according  to  Avicenna
(common  sense  or  fantasy,  imagination,  imaginative  power,  estimative  power,
memory)  (SN,  27.3).  Aside  from  the  following  « actor »  passage,  the  next  chapters
consist primarily of quotations from Augustine’s De trinitate. These are interrupted, as
Lieser (1928: 166) notes, by citations inspired by a completely different body of thought
and which do not properly fit in the preceding analysis. Thus, the notion of cogitation
(cogitatio) in Augustine leads Vincent to introduce the understanding of this notion in
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Damascene  and  Avicenna  (as  interpreted  by  La  Rochelle)  (LIESER,  1928:  166-167).
Differentiating between the operations of common sense, imagination, and cogitative
virtue  (excogitatio),  John  of  Damascus  points  to  the  ability  of  the  latter  to  make
judgements and compositions, and also to be the origin of action or flight (SN, 27.9).
The  next  chapter  reviews  the  functioning  of  common  sense,  imagination,  and  the
cogitative / imaginative power according Avicenna. Vincent makes at this point clear
that the third inner power is called cogitative if it responds to the intellect, imaginative
if  it  responds  to  the  animal  virtue  (SN,  27.10).  The  subsequent  chapters  address
memory. A quotation from La Rochelle is joined to a definition from the Damascene:
« memory  is  the  accumulation  of  sense  and  of  intelligence ».  All  sensible  things,
according to La Rochelle, are received by the sense and become opinion; intelligible
things are received by the intellect and become intelligence. We have, nevertheless, no
memory of the substance of the intelligible forms (SN, 27.11). The discussion of memory
and the « storage » of the intelligible forms is continued with a quotation from Albert
the Great’s De homine (SN,  27.11)42.  The next chapters resume the views on memory
according to Constantine the African and Aristotle. Before turning again to Augustine,
another quotation from La Rochelle presents the « reminiscence » as a special case of
memory, which acts by retrieving the forms that have been forgotten (SN, 27.14).
59 The Avicennian faculty psychology is also at the base of Vincent’s discussion of the
intellect (virtus intellectiva) and its role in the process of abstraction. By means of four
quotations  from  the  Summa  de  anima,  he  resumes  the  discussion  on  the  order  of
abstraction  of  the  corporeal  forms,  the  different  manners  of  apprehending
corresponding to the different perceptive instances, and the knowledge of the intellect.
The explanation of four of the inner senses (leaving memory aside) and its bringing
together with the intellect roughly mirrors the description of the process of abstraction
in  book  25,  consisting  in  a  quotation  from  Avicenna  (SN,  27.35).  The  difference  in
abstraction regarding the accidental and essential characteristics of the sensible forms,
another notion from the Avicennian passage, is deepened to some extent in the next
chapter  (SN,  27.36).  The  different  orders  of  abstraction  and  their  relationship  to
knowledge is  further  analysed in  the  ensuing passage:  If  the  forms are  thoroughly
abstracted  from  matter  and  the  appendages  that  depend  on  matter,  then  we  are
dealing  with  spirituals  forms—or  metaphysical  forms,  as  they  are  called  by  the
philosophers. There are other forms that are abstracted from matter, but which are not
abstracted from their material condition. This is the case of the mathematical forms. A
« line » and a « figure » do not define whether their matter is made up of gold or of
wood, but they do define their position and situation (in space). Similarly, a number
does not define whether there are two or three objects (in the world), but it does define
the multiplication and the division which belong to the material conditions. And then
there are other forms that are abstracted in their own ways, for instance, the natural or
physical forms such as fire, earth, bones and flesh. They are abstracted with respect to
a situation and array that are proper to matter and the conditions of matter (SN, 27.37).
These three different orders of abstraction are related respectively to the activities of
the  intellect,  the  imagination  and  the  common sense,  and  the  outer  senses.  These
abstractions are not fixed. What is perceived by the outer senses can be apprehended in
a further stage by the imagination, and subsequently by the intellect. La Rochelle also
relates these different manners of knowledge to the Augustinian doctrine of the three
kinds of visions (visio intellectualis, visio spiritualis [here: imaginaria], visio corporalis) (SN,
27.37). 
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60 The subsequent chapter resorts  also to  John of  La Rochelle  for  explaining how the
forms (or species) that are apprehended by the sensitive soul reach the rational soul,
introducing the distinction between the passive and the active intellect. The passive
intellect is transitory; the active is immortal and separable (from the body). The passive
intellect  is  the inferior  power of  the intellective part,  which is  connected with the
sensitive part, and it belongs to the rational soul as long as this is united to the body. It
grasps the intelligible forms in the sensible forms (phantasmata); its proper function is
to connect the act of the intellectual power with the act of the sensitive power, offering
the sensible forms for abstraction. This power is also called reason (rationalitas) and has
its place in the middle chamber of the brain, called logistical or rational. It is able to
distinguish  the  universals  in  the  particulars,  although  the  universals  are  not
comprehended in a universal manner (SN, 27.38). The separable intellect can be divided
into possible and active intellect. These intellects differ with respect to their nature.
The first is similar to matter and is possible with respect to anything, like a board on
which no signs have yet been written. The active intellect is active like the light, which
always illuminates. The intelligible light of the first truth is naturally impressed upon
us. The active intellect corresponds to the intelligible forms that are being shown, in
the  way  light  corresponds  with  colours.  In  this  manner,  the  possible  intellect  can
receive the intelligible species, and the active intellect makes manifest the first truth
that  was  given  to  human beings  (cf.  TELLKAMP,  2010:  39).  By  means  of  the  possible
intellect  we are able,  therefore,  to apprehend what has not been apprehended (SN,
27.38). Vincent adds that, according to Avicenna, something is needed for the intellect
to be transformed from a state of potentiality to a performative state (in effectu). This is
the  active  intellect  (SN,  27.38).  Further  discussions  on  nature  and  activity  of  the
intellect and its knowledge of the intelligible forms appear in the subsequent chapters,
which mainly refer to Albert the Great. With respect to the role of the intellect (or
reason, or intellective power) in abstraction, one can refer here to two quotations from
Albert which distinguish different kinds of intellects according to Alexander of Halès,
Al-Kindi  (c.  801–873),  Ibn Rushd (latinised as  Averroes,  1126–1198),  the  Damascene,
Avicenna and Aristotle (SN, 27.39; see also 27.40). Vincent also provides an explanation
of the process leading from the possible intellect to science according to Albert (SN,
27.46),  and  from  the  possible  (equated  with  the  material)  intellect  leading  to  the
intellectus accomodatus in usu referring to La Rochelle (SN,  27.46). Chapters 49–52 (all
Albert’s De homine quotations) also discuss the functioning of the possible and active
intellects,  considering as well  their  knowledge of  things and phantasmata (cf.  LIESER,
1928:  183)43. An  account  of  the  diverse  operations  of  the  speculative  intellect  (to
discover,  to judge,  to remember,  and to interpret)  according to La Rochelle (53–55)
closes the section on rational knowledge. In the remaining chapters, which deal with
rational motion, there is one passage dedicated to fantasy. Fantasy is considered here,
as in book 25 (103), to be a motive power or an initiation of motion.
 
Concluding remarks
61 The schemes of the soul are ambiguous. The « medical distinction »—the vital, natural,
and animal powers—can be understood as an elaboration on the sensitive soul of the
Aristotelian distinction, while the Platonic division of the soul is considered exclusively
in  its  concupiscible  and irascible  contents,  and  frequently  incorporated  into  other
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soul’s  schemes  (such  as  Avicenna’s).  The  encyclopaedists  are  basically  synthesising
other syntheses and they are aware of the various accounts of the soul and its powers.
Since they are  not  aiming at  the formulation of  an all-encompassing system,  these
various accounts are dispersed throughout their books on the soul. Yet certain central
principles  are  at  work  on  the  general  level  of  their  expositions:  Bartholomew  the
Englishman  arranges  the  first  chapters  of  his  book  on  the  soul to  some  extent  in
accordance  with  the  Aristotelian  division  of  the  soul,  explicitly  orders  the  soul’s
potencies according to different criteria, and finally embeds his discussion about the
five  senses  and  the  pulse  in  the  explanation  of  the  vis  animalis of  the  « medical
distinction ». In the Speculum naturale, the Aristotelian division is the leading principle
for the arrangement of books 24–27 of the soul, which are preceded by the medical
discussion (at least according to the intended order).
62 That the different views of the soul are dispersed throughout these books is the main
reason  one  cannot  follow  a  strict  division  between  « medical-physiological »  and
« functional-philosophical »  sources.  Such a  clear-cut  distinction  would  obscure  the
intertwining  of  the  different  traditions,  and  also  the  fact  that  some  philosophical
accounts  « absorb » and further develop some contents  of  the medical  tradition.  In
other  words,  the  usual  reference  to  « physicians »  and  « philosophers »  by  the
encyclopaedists should be taken as a reflection of the origin of their sources, and not as
a rigid dichotomy.
63 In general, Thomas’s Liber de natura rerum offers the more theological, « Augustinian »
view of the soul—in line with the 12th century theological authors, especially the writer
of the treatise De spiritu et anima, which is Thomas’s main source. The physiological-
medical doctrine of the ventricles of the brain and the related concept of the spirit are
nonetheless  present  to  some  extent,  though  we  may  simply  be  witnessing  the
incorporation of these contents into De spiritu et anima. Bartholomew’s De proprietatibus
rerum exhibits  also  many  elements  of  Peripatetic  philosophy,  several  of  which  are
indebted to the « treatise on the soul » contained in Scot’s Liber introductorius: First the
Aristotelian, and then the « medical » distinction account for the diverse actions of the
soul within the body. Thus, one may attribute to these authors an understanding of the
soul that comprises the « physiological-medical » account. Since other Peripatetic traits
have found their way into both encyclopaedias, one may ask why some of the « new »
knowledge  (such  as  abstraction  and  the  role  of  the  intellect  within)  was  not
incorporated  as  well.  By  contrast, all  the  different  accounts  of  the  soul  are  well
represented in Vincent’s Speculum naturale.  In a sense, this work accomplishes most
effectively  the  objective  of  gathering  all  available  wisdom  into  a  single  book:  It
incorporates quotations from traditional Augustinian accounts all the way up to the
reworking of Avicenna’s philosophy by John of La Rochelle and Albert the Great. The
breadth of quotations exemplifies the impetus of exhaustiveness that characterises his
whole  work.  His  main  aim  is  to  offer  an  all-encompassing  rather  than  a  coherent
account of the soul.  The novel arrangement and expanded treatment of the soul in
Speculum (25) reflects his belief that knowledge about the inner senses and the role of
the intellect(s) should be available to his fellow brethren.
64 In line with classical philosophy, the subjects of sensation and perception appear in the
examinations of the union of the soul and body. The encyclopaedists reflect on the
« incorporated » soul in its ability to perceive and to know, on the one hand, and in its
ability to strive for something and to move towards it, on the other. The explanations
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of perception consider both the physiology of the cognitive faculties and the process of
abstraction.  This  process  of  abstraction is  recognisable  to  some extent  in  all  three
encyclopaedias,  though  especially  in  Speculum  naturale.  The  passages  dedicated  to
abstraction also indicate an initial shift from an explication of cognition based on the
role of the animal spirit and the morphology of the brain to one grounded instead in a
process  that  depends  on  the  characteristics  of  matter,  their  agreement  with  the
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The Powers of the Soul in De proprietatibus rerum
(Bartholomew the Englishman)
N.B. This characterisation is based roughly (it has been completed) on Long, « Introduction
(Liber III) », 2007:  139–140.
1. According to its end
  1.1 rational power. It divides according to its acts into:
    1.1.1 speculative intellect
    1.1.2 practical intellect
  1.2 concupiscible power. Origin of the affections:
    1.2.1 joy
    1.2.2 hope 
  1.3 irascible power. Origin of the affections:
    1.3.1 fear
    1.3.2 pain
2. According to its act
  2.1 vegetable. It divides into:
    2.1.1 generative




    2.1.3 augmentative
  2.2 sensible, it has the following powers:
    2.2.1 apprehensive, encompasses: 
• five exterior senses 
• common or interior sense




  2.3 rational 
3. According to its body
  3.1 sensuality 
  3.2 sensation 
  3.3 imagination
  3.4 reason
  3.5 intellect
4. By means of which the soul operates in the body
  4.1 natural (located in the liver)
  4.2 vital (located in the heart)
  4.3 animal (located in the brain). It comprehends:
    4.3.1 ordinative
• fantasy or imagination
• judgment and reason
• memory
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    4.3.2 sensitive
    4.3.3 motive
 
The powers of the Soul in Liber de natura rerum
(Thomas of Cantimpré)
1. Platonic Distinction
  1.1 vis rationalis
  1.2 vis concupiscibilis. Origin of the affections:
    1.2.1 joy
    1.2.2 hope
  1.3 vis irascibilis. Origin of the affections:
    1.3.1 fear
    1.3.2 pain
2. Aristotelian Distinction
  2.1 anima vegetabilis
  2.2 anima sensibilis
  2.3 anima rationalis
3. Cognitive powers
  3.1 sensus 
  3.2 imaginatio
3.3 ratio
  3.4 intellectus
  3.5 intelligentia
Or:
  3.1 sensus 
  3.2 imaginatio
  3.3 ratio
  3.4 memoria
  3.5 intellectus
  3.6 intelligentia
Or:
  3.1 sensus
  3.2 imaginatio
  3.3 cogitatio
  3.4 ingenium
  3.5 ratio. It comprehends:
    3.5.1 sapientia
    3.5.2 prudentia
  3.6 memoria
  3.7 intelligentia
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The soul in Speculum Naturale (Vincent of Beauvais)
A. Books on psychology (cf. LIESER, 1928: 6)
Book 23 (81 chapters): the soul according to its substance
Books 24-27: the soul according to its powers, namely:
Book 24 (88 chapters): natural, vital, animal powers; vegetable soul
Book 25 (104 chapters): the sensible soul
Book 26 (111 chapters): sleep, wakefulness; vision, rapture, ecstasy
Book 27 (103 chapters): the rational soul 
 
B. Content matter of the relevant books
Book 23 (adapted from LIESER, 1928: 98-127)
1. Definition (9-10)
2. Origin (1-2, 11)
3. Nature and Being
  3.1 Simplicity (12-13)
  3.2 Relationship to its powers (14-16)
  3.3 As image of God (17-24)
  3.4 As image of every creature (25)
  3.5 The soul of human beings, of brute animals, and of angels (26)
4. Soul and Body
  4.1 Soul’s Independence from space and from its body (27-41)
  4.2 Union of soul and body (42-48)
    4.2.1 Antagonism between both components (43-44)
    4.2.2 Soul as form of the body (42-43, 46)
    4.2.3 The Problem of the Intermediaries (44, 46-47)
  4.3 Essential union between body and soul (49-61)
  4.4 Passivity of the soul (57-59)
5. Immortality (62-81)
 
Book 24 (cf. LIESER, 1928: 131-132)
1. Natural, vital, animal power (24,3-60)
  1.1 virtus naturalis (4-10)
    1.1.1 virtus generans (4)
• virtus informans (4)
    1.1.2 virtus nutriens (4)
    1.1.3 virtus pascens (4). It divides into:
virtus attrahens (5)
• virtus retinens (5)
• virtus immutans secunda or digerens (6)
• virtus expellens (6)
  1.2 virtus vitalis (11-55). It divides into:
    1.2.1 v. v. agens (11 u. 52-54)
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    1.2.2 v. v. patiens (55)
  1.3 virtus animalis (56). It divides into:
    1.3.1 mens. It divides into:
• phantasia (imagination)
• cogitatio (faculty of thought)
• memoria (memory)
    1.3.2 virtus sentiens (sensation)
    1.3.3. virtus movens (faculty of movement)
2. Vegetative soul (24,63-88). It divides into (cf. LIESER, 1928: 135-139):
• vis nutritiva (66-71)
• vis augmentativa (74)
• vis generativa (80, 84, 85)
 
Book 25 (cf. LIESER, 1928: 139)
1. About the apprehensive and motive powers in general (1-7)
2. Sensitive Knowledge / Sense cognition (8-100)
  2.1 Exterior (8-83)
    2.1.1 General considerations (8-27)






  2.2 Inner (84-100)
    2.2.1 General considerations (84-86)
    2.2.2 Singular considerations:
• sensus communis or phantasia (87-96)
• imagination (97-98)
• aestimatio (99) 
• memoria (100)
3. Sensitive Motion / Movement
 
Book 26
Wakefulness, sleep, and dream
 
Book 27 (cf. LIESER, 1928: 161-193)
1. Rational Knowledge
  1.1 ratio superior
    1.1.1 The notion of mens
    1.1.2 The image of God
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  1.2 ratio inferior
    1.2.1 The notion of ratio inferior
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knowledge  by  the  specific  cognitive  faculties;  it  addresses the  contributions  by  John  of  La
Rochelle and Albert the Great more distinctly against an Avicennian background; it discusses the
partition in vis naturalis, vis vitalis, and vis animalis in light of medical sources (and texts influenced
by them) from the 11th and 12th centuries.
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7. For a discussion of the faculties of the soul in Plato, see CORCILIUS K., « Faculties in Ancient
Philosophy », in PERLER D. (ed.), The Faculties, 2015: 23-32.
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9. For a discussion of the authorship of this book, and a negative answer to the authorship of
Alcher of  Clairvaux,  see NORPOTH L.,  Der  pseudo-augustinische  Traktat  De  spiritu  et  anima,  Köln,
1971: 52-72.
10. For a discussion about the use of Jean de la Rochelle of this source, see MICHAUD-QUANTIN P.,
« Une  division  « augustinienne »  des  puissances  de  l’âme  au  moyen  âge »,  Revue  des  Etudes
Augustiniennes, 3, 1957, p. 235–248: 237–238.
11. For a discussion of the four emotions and the « Platonic » soul in De spiritu et  anima,  see 
PONGRATZ, Die psychologische Struktur, 1950: 95–96.
12. The  knowledge  of  the  rational  soul  is  the  subject  of  SN  27.  29-40.  Following  mainly  La
Rochelle, Vincent deals with the knowledge of God by intelligence (supra se), of the pure spirits by
the intellect (iuxta se), of the soul (intra se), and of the objects of the world by reason (infra se); cf.
LIESER L., Vinzenz von Beauvais, 1928: 174–175.
13. For the iteration of the quotation of De spiritu et anima at the beginning of these two books,
see PAULMIER-FOUCART M, « L’évolution du traitement des cinq sens dans le Speculum maius de
Vincent de Beauvais », in CALLEBAT L. – DESBORDES O. (eds.), Science antique - science médiévale. Actes
du colloque international, Mont-Saint-Michel, 4-7 septembre 1998, Hildesheim i.a., 2000, p. 273–295: 281.
14. The questions 8–68 of this work build a « disproportionately extended philosophical section
on the vegetative, animal, and rational parts of the soul »; cf. HASSE N., Avicenna’s De Anima in the
Latin West. The formation of a peripatetic philosophy of the soul, 1160 - 1300,  London / Turin, 2000,
(Warburg Institute Studies and Texts, 1): 62.
15. The last section of this book is entitled De divisione virium anime secundum Avicennam. For the
schema of the soul powers according the Summa de anima, see LIESER, Vinzenz von Beauvais, 1928:
128–129; for the nine divisions of the soul in the three works of La Rochelle, see MICHAUD-QUANTIN,
« Une division « augustinienne », 1957: 236.
16. Although never explicitly mentioned by Bartholomew the Englishman (except in the final and
perhaps later table of auctoritates), Michael Scot’s Liber introductorius is an important source for
DPR, 3. One of the four manuscripts of this book, which represents a shorter redaction and dates
from the 14th century, contains a long treatise on the soul (MS Escorial f. III.8, ff. 34ra–53vb). In
his edition, Long identifies parallelisms with Scot’s work in eleven of the twenty-four chapters,
while chapters 8, 9, 11, and 16 seem to derive entirely from it. Long mentions that the listing of
definitions of the soul featured here (DPR, 3.2.3-77) is « virtually identical » to the one of that
manuscript  (see  Long  R.,  « Introduction  (Liber  III) »,  in  van  den  Abeele  B.  et  alii (eds.),  De
proprietatibus rerum.  vol. I, 2007:  138). Hasse identifies still more quotations from this book in
DPR, especially the medical ideas exposed in Scot’s « treatise on the soul » (ff. 46ra to 48vb) are
borrowed by Bartholomew (DPR,  3.8–21),  cf.  HASSE,  Avicenna’s  De Anima,  2000:  23–30 (for  the
medical borrowings, see p. 29, n. 87). For Scot as a source of other books (DPR,1, 2 and maybe 8),
cf.  DRAELANTS I.,  FRUNZEANU E.,  « Le  savoir  astronomique  et  ses  sources  dans  le  De  mundo  et
corporibus celestibus de Barthélemy l’Anglais », Rursus, 11, 2017, placed on line 22 December 2017.
URL : http://journals.openedition.org/rursus/1352 ; DOI : https://doi.org/10.4000/rursus.1352.
17. In his Libellus apologeticus, the preface to the Speculum maius, Vincent states that he is not
composing one text, but merely compiling one. He is thus an actor, and not an author (auctor). In
the Speculum naturale, the actor passages seem to have generally a didactic character and take
sometimes the form of a scholastic « quaestio »,  see PAULMIER-FOUCART M.,  « Les passages Actor
dans le Speculum maius de Vincent de Beauvais: essai de typologie », in BOUFFARTIGUE J. – MELONIO F.
(eds.),  L’Entreprise  encyclopédique,  Nanterre,  1997,  (Littérales,  21),  p. 207-219: 216–219.  Cf.  also
VILLARROEL I., « Las fuentes ocultas del actor en el tratado sobre la scientia moralis del Speculum
doctrinale (V-VI) de Vicente de Beauvais », Rursus, 11, 2017, placed on line 22 December 2017,
consulted 24 April 2019. URL: http://journals.openedition.org/rursus/1381; DOI: 10.4000/rursus.
1381.
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18. For the identification of the philosopher with La Rochelle, and for a discussion of chapters 46
and 47, see LIESER, Vinzenz von Beauvais, 1928: 118–120.
19. For a discussion of the passage of La Rochelle, which associates directly the nature of the
elements to the humours, see RYAN D., An Examination of a Thirteenth-Century Treatise on the Mind /
Body  Dichotomy.  Jean  de  La  Rochelle  on  the  Soul  and  its  Powers.  Submitted  in  fulfilment  of  the
requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy, 2010 (unpublished), consulted 16 July 2017.
URL:  http://eprints.maynoothuniversity.ie/2566/1/
Version2_Denise_Ryan_PhD_Final_Submitted_2010_corrected.pdf, p. 101.
20. This discussion of the "pneuma" theory is taken partly from ORTÚZAR ESCUDERO, M. J., « The Role
of the ‘spiritus animalis’  in Accounts of Perception. Medical and Philosophical Remarks from
three 13th-century Encyclopaedias », Vincent of Beauvais Newsletter, 42, 2018b, p. 4–16.
21. In the chapters discussed in this paragraph, Long identifies parallelisms with Scot’s treatise
on the soul (Liber  introductorius)  in DPR,  3.12.3–15;  3.12.25–31;  3.13.2–15;  3.14.11–15;  3.16.2–30.
Figuring prominently among the sources of this section on the soul are 12th century authors, but
also new Avicennian theories and authors of the medical tradition of Monte Cassino–Salerno. For
a discussion of this section and its sources, see MORPURGO P., « Fonti Di Michele Scoto », Rendiconti
dell' Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei, 38, 1983 : 59–71; HASSE, Avicenna’s De Anima, 2000: 23–30.
22. For the account of perception according to Augustine, see SILVA J. F., « Augustine on Active
Perception », in SILVA J. F. - YRJÖNSUURI, M. (eds.), Active Perception in the History of Philosophy. From
Plato to Modern Philosophy, Cham, 2014, p. 79–98; also ORTÚZAR ESCUDERO M. J., Die Sinne in den Schriften
Hildegards von Bingen. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Sinneswahrnehmung, Stuttgart, 2016: 124–127.
23. A  similar  distinction  was  used  by  Bartholomew  and  Thomas  when  referring  to  the
Aristotelian threefold soul.
24. De spiritu et anima knows just one chamber (and not two) in the front of the brain; cf. NORPOTH, 
Der pseudo-augustinische Traktat, 1971: 112.
25. John of La Rochelle was Alexander of Halès’s main collaborator, and probably also the author
of the first and fourth tomes of the Summa halensis. For a short introduction to this work, see
SCHUMACHER L., « The Summa Halensis: Sources and Context. Introduction», in SCHUMACHER L. (ed.),
The Summa Halensis: Sources and Context, Berlin – Boston, 2020, p. 1–8, placed on line 22 June 2020.
URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110685022-003.
26. Another division of the human soul into affective and cognitive parts is to be found in the
second chapter of De spiritu et anima, see MICHAUD-QUANTIN P., « La classification des puissances de
l’âme au XIIe siècle », Revue du moyen âge latin, 5, 1949b, p. 15–34: 24–25.
27. For a short account of the interpretation and elaboration of Avicenna by La Rochelle, see
KNUUTTILA S., Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy, Oxford, 2004: 230–232.
28. Cf.  LIESER,  Vinzenz von Beauvais,  1928: 184–185. For further development of the subject, see
chapters 64 to 68 of this book.
29. The distinction between sensation and perception, which I will be using in the following, is
not an antique or medieval one. Nevertheless, this modern distinction is useful for explaining the
soul capacities and their contribution to knowledge.
30. For Boethius, see also KEMP S., Cognitive psychology in the Middle Ages, Westport Conn i.a., 1996,
(Contributions in psychology, 33): 16; MICHAUD-QUANTIN, « La classification », 1949b: 16–17.
31. For an overview table, see NÉMETH C., Contemplation and the Cognition of God. Victorine Theological
Anthropology  and  its  Decline.  Doctoral  Dissertation,  Central  European  University,  Budapest,
Hungary,  2013  (unpublished),  consulted on 20  September  2017,  URL:  http://www.etd.ceu.hu/
2014/mphnec01.pdf,  p.  34.  For  « Cistercians »  approaches,  see  MICHAUD-QUANTIN,  « La
classification », 1949b: 20–32.
32. For the quotation from the Damascene by La Rochelle, see RYAN, An examination, 2010: 138.
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33. For  the  quotations  of  La  Rochelle  from  De  spiritu  et  anima for  describing  this  fivefold
distinction, see RYAN, An examination, 2010: 133. 
34. Already in  De  homine,  Albert  postulates  that  fantasy  together  with  the  estimative  power
operate  in  perceiving  intentions.  The  function  of  fantasy  is  to  compose  or  divide  forms  by
« which  true  or  false  intentions  are  produced »;  the  estimative  power  « points  to  an  action
regarding a material object »; see TELLKAMP J. A., « Albert the Great on Structure & Function of the
Inner Senses »,  in TAYLOR R.  –  OMAR  I.  (eds.),  The Judeo-Christian-Islamic  heritage:  Philosophical  &
Theological  Perspectives,  Milwaukee / Wis.,  2012,  p. 305–324: 321.  This disparate view regarding
intentions could be the reason for not referring to De homine when explaining the other inner
senses. 
35. For  an  account  of  the  common  sense  by  La  Rochelle  (and  also  for  the  source  of  this
quotation), see RYAN, An examination, 2010: 198.
36. For  the  « coordinative »  ability  of  the  common  sense  in  Albert,  see  THEISS P.,  Die
Wahrnehmungspsychologie  und  Sinnesphysiologie  des  Albertus Magnus.  Ein  Modell  der  Sinnes-  und
Hirnfunktion aus der Zeit des Mittelalters, Frankfurt am Main – Wien i. a., 1997: 85–86.
37. For the common sense as the instance through which we became aware of our perception in
Albert, see THEISS, Die Wahrnehmungspsychologie, 1997: 88.
38. For the « sensibilia communia » in Albert, see THEISS, Die Wahrnehmungspsychologie, 1997: 86–
87.
39. For a commentary on this passage, cf. LIESER, Vinzenz von Beauvais, 1928: 148. For Avicenna’s
account of the intentions of the sensible forms and its repercussions in some authors of the 13th
century, including La Rochelle, cf. RYAN, An examination, 2010: 200–207.
40. For  the  assertion,  that  it  can  be  no  memory  without  « phantasmata »,  see  RYAN,  An
examination, 2010: 146–147.
41. La Rochelle’s employs a sort of equivalence system, consisting basically in the correlation of
an element  of  the  philosophical  or  Avicennian classification with one faculty  that  the  sancti
mention and study. In this manner, he considers the existence of one inferior and one superior
intellect in Avicenna. The latest (practically equal to the active intellect) obtains the Augustinian
name of mens or intelligentia with regard to their cognitive functions. The same happens to the
inferior intellect (possible or speculative): it is equated to the ratio; cf. MICHAUD-QUANTIN P., « Les
puissances de l’âme chez Jean de la Rochelle », Antonianum, 24, 1949a, p. 489–505: 498–499.
42. For the problem of the « storage » of the intelligibles according Albert the Great, see also 
THEISS, Die Wahrnehmungspsychologie, 1997: 108.
43. In De homine, Albert follows mainly Aristotle for his section on the intellect, because he rejects
the Avicennian view of the active intellect as separate; cf. HASSE, Avicenna’s De Anima, 2000: 66.
ABSTRACTS
The  compilations  of  Bartholomew  the  Englishman,  Thomas  of  Cantimpré,  and  Vincent  of
Beauvais (Speculum naturale) manifest in some manner how perception was considered during the
first half of the 13th century. To properly understand perception, though, one has to first deal
with  the  different  conceptions  of  the  soul.  Two different  views of  the  soul  have  often been
distinguished in these encyclopaedias: one « physiological-medical » and the other « functional-
philosophical ». In this paper, I offer an alternative interpretation based on a systematic analysis
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of  the  powers  of  the  soul  and  the  various  explanations  of  their  faculties.  This  leads  to  the
conclusion that there are at  least  four different,  yet  interconnected views of  the soul  in the
encyclopaedias.  In addition, cognition itself  is  considered a process that encompasses several
faculties. These faculties account either for an ascending path towards God or for intellectual
knowledge (by means of abstraction).
Les compilations de Barthélemy l'Anglais, de Thomas de Cantimpré et de Vincent de Beauvais
(Speculum naturale) montrent comment la perception était considérée pendant la première moitié
du XIIIe siècle. Mais pour bien comprendre cette conception de la perception, il  faut d'abord
s'intéresser à celle de l'âme. Deux conceptions différentes de l'âme ont souvent été distinguées
dans ces encyclopédies: l'une "physiologico-médicale" et l'autre "fonctionnaliste-philosophique".
Cet  article  propose  une  interprétation  alternative  basée  sur  une  analyse  systématique  des
pouvoirs de l'âme et des diverses explications de ses facultés. Cela conduit à la conclusion qu'il
existe dans les encyclopédies de cette époque au moins quatre conceptions de l'âme, différentes
mais interconnectées. En outre, la cognition elle-même est considérée comme un processus qui
englobe plusieurs facultés. Ces facultés constituent soit un chemin ascendant vers Dieu, soit une
connaissance intellectuelle (par le biais de l'abstraction).
INDEX
Mots-clés: psychologie, perception sensorielle, facultés de l’âme, encyclopédies, XIIIe siècle
Keywords: Psychology, Sense Perception, Faculties of the Soul, 13th Century Encyclopaedias
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